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INTRODUCTION

This Article identifies the causes and consequences of a
puzzling asymmetry in constitutional law. Of the three facets of
adjudicative factfinding-evidence, procedure, and rules of decisiononly two are constitutionalized. Constitutional law regulates
procedural and decisional rules, but not whether the evidence that
factfinders use is adequate.
Constitutional law regulates procedure through a set of rules
that determine a person's power to control the trial by adducing
evidence in support of her case and by examining the evidence of her
adversary. Constitutional law regulates decisionmaking by setting
probability requirements for findings of fact-standards of proof-and
by allocating the burdens of proof among the prosecution, plaintiffs,
and defendants. Constitutional law, however, does not control
adequacy of the evidence upon which factfinders determine the
probability of contested allegations and apply the burdens of proof.
This is so because the Supreme Court interprets the Due Process
Clause, as related to evidence, very narrowly. Under this
interpretation, any evidence is constitutionally adequate when its use
is not "fundamentally unfair."1 Moreover, "fundamental unfairness"
occurs only in extreme cases such as those which exhibit a serious
prosecutorial misuse of the trial process. Examples include when the
government knowingly procures the defendant's conviction by false
evidence or by evidence from which factfinders can draw no rational
inferences. 2 Anything less is not "fundamentally unfair." As a result,
virtually any rule that controls evidential admissibility and identifies
evidence that does or does not require corroboration is constitutional.
The "fundamental unfairness" criterion practically exempts evidential
adequacy from constitutional scrutiny.
Under this regime, as long as factfinders apply the "beyond a
reasonable doubt" standard, they can convict a defendant upon any
inculpating evidence. This evidence may include the defendant's
uncorroborated confession, 3 uncorroborated testimony of the
defendant's accomplice, a DNA statistic, or even the defendant's prior
crimes. Evidential insecurity would not make the verdict
unconstitutional, 4 as constitutional scrutiny only applies to evidence
1.
See infra Part I.C.
2.
See infra Part I.C.
3.
The confession, of course, must not be a product of coercive police interrogation. If it is,
the court would have to suppress it under the prophylactic exclusionary rule. See infra note 11.
4.
An appellate court can only overturn such a verdict if no rational juror could deliver it.
See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) ("[The relevant question is whether, after
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implicating the defendant's participatory powers under the Sixth
Amendment. A rule that blocks the admission of defense evidence
might detract from the defendant's right to compulsory process. A rule
that allows factfinders to rely on hearsay statements as evidence
against the defendant might detract from the defendant's right to
confrontation. While such detractions are of constitutional concern,5
this concern is about the quality of the trial process rather than the
adequacy of the evidence. 6 And for rules that determine evidential
adequacy-admissibility, corroboration, and "one witness" 7 rulesthere is no constitutional review.
This constitutional asymmetry is puzzling. Adjudicative
factfinding takes place under uncertainty and thus involves risk of
error.8 Adjudicators 9 allocate this risk in every single case, civil and
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.").
5.
See infra text accompanying notes 17-30.
6.
The focal point of the Sixth Amendment's participatory requirements is the defendant's
opportunity "to fight back" by adducing evidence and by cross-examining adverse witnesses. See
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004) ("[The Sixth Amendment] commands not that
evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the
crucible of cross.examination."). The confrontation doctrine, as interpreted until recently, made
only one reference to evidential adequacy by requiring "indicia of reliability" for any statement
made against the defendant by a person who does not testify in court and classifies as
"unavailable." Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1980), overruled in part by Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (holding that Ohio v. Roberts only applies to non-testimonial
hearsay statements). To limit the admissibility of such statements, the Supreme Court held that
"adequate indicia of reliability" must be present in the statement itself. Corroborative evidenceno matter how trustworthy it is-will not do. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 814-23 (1990). The
Court made it clear that what matters here is not the statement's probability of being true, but
rather the defendant's opportunity to uncover its flaws and falsities by cross-examining the
person who made it. Evidence corroborating the statement is no substitute for such crossexamination. Id.

at 822-23; see also AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL

PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES 125-31 (1997) (observing that the confrontation doctrine promotes
truth-finding via cross-examination, rather than through sorting hearsay statements by
credibility). According to the most recent understanding of the doctrine, the confrontation
requirement applies to inculpatory testimonial statements alone, but its application is rigid.
There are no "indicia of reliability" that could substitute the defendant's right to cross-examine
the maker of a testimonial hearsay statement relied upon by the prosecution. The court can
admit such a statement over the defendant's objection only when the defendant is given an
opportunity to cross-examine its maker at or before trial, or when he forfeits this right by
committing a wrongdoing. See infra notes 23 and 30.
7.
The "one witness" rule, generally adopted across the United States, authorizes
factfinders to determine facts on a testimony of a single witness. 7 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2034(2), at 343 (James H. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1978)
(stating as a general principle that a jury may decide a case on the uncorroborated testimony of a
single witness); see United States v. Ingram, 600 F.2d 260, 263 (10th Cir. 1979) (stating courts'
general adherence to the "one witness" rule); United States v. Levi, 405 F.2d 380, 383 (4th Cir.
1968) (same).
8.

See ALEX STEIN, FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE LAw 34-36 (2005) (identifying causes and

pervasiveness of the risk of error in adjudicative factfinding).
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criminal. The risk's allocation depends on evidence, procedure, and the
rule of decision applied. The rule of decision allocates the risk of error
by setting the standards of proof for factual allegations and by placing
the burden of proof on a given party. I identify this risk as
"decisional." The rules of procedure allocate control over management
of the trial by giving litigants participatory powers that enable each
litigant to promote her case by evidence and argumentation. The
participatory power thus allows a litigant to protect herself against
impositions of the risk of error. But it also allows a litigant to expose
her adversary to that risk: a litigant may use her participatory power
to distort the factfinders' information or obfuscate the applicable rule
of decision. 10 I identify this risk as "participatory." Finally, the rules of
evidential adequacy determine the information-qualitatively and
quantitatively-on which factfinders can rely in their decisions. These
rules allocate risks I identify as "informational."
Constitutional law protects people against decisional and
participatory risks, but not against informational risks. This policy is
inconsistent. If constitutional protections against decisional and
participatory risks shield people from wrongful deprivation of their
liberties and properties, why allow lawmakers and judges to chip
away at these protections by distributing informational risks as they
deem fit?
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I compares the
constitutional regulation of procedure and decisions with the
minimalist "fundamental unfairness" criterion for evidence rules. This
discussion evaluates the constitutionally unprotected domain of
evidence alongside the protected domains of procedure and decision.
Allocation of the risk of error by the rules of procedure and decision
must satisfy the broad constitutional requirement of minimizing
harm-the "least harm principle," for short-under which a decisional
or procedural rule must work to reduce the net amount of harm from
an erroneous disposition of the case. The greater the harm, the stricter
9.
The term "adjudicators" refers to judges and juries in their respective roles as trial
managers and factfinders. "Factfinders" also refers to both judges and juries, but only in their
factfinding capacity.
10. A prosecutor, for example, may use the defendant's criminal record to impeach his true
testimony about duress. Alternatively, she may frame duress as an "affirmative defense," which
the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence, even though in reality the defense
negates "malice"-an element of the crime that the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt. Cf. Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 474 (1895) (holding that when defendant's
insanity negates "malice aforethought," the prosecution has the burden of disproving it beyond a
reasonable doubt); cf. also Dixon v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2437, 2441 n.4 (2006) (observing
that when duress negates malice or another form of mens rea, the prosecution carries the burden
of disproving it beyond a reasonable doubt).
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the procedural and decisional requirements for authorizing its
infliction. Substantial deviation from this principle renders the rule in
question unconstitutional. There is, however, no similar requirement
for evidence rules and, consequently, no constitutional protection
against informational risks. Constitutional law only addresses the
apportionment of decisional and participatory risks, which is puzzling.
Part II develops a theory that supports the installation of
constitutional control over evidence rules. Decisional, participatory,
and informational risks have different causes, but the same effect: an
erroneous decision that deprives a person of her liberty or property.
Therefore, the allocation of informational risks by the rules of
evidence must answer the same constitutional criteria that control the
allocation of decisional and participatory risks. The Supreme Court
devised these constitutional criteria in accordance with its vision as to
how to allocate the risks of error. The Court's decision not to extend
these criteria to evidence rules therefore appears to be an oversight.
In developing this argument, I examine the widespread
perception of evidence rules as rare and sporadic exceptions to
unregulated factfinding. This perception permeates a number of
constitutional doctrines and evidence law itself. As such, it provides a
partial explanation to the "fundamental unfairness" standard. I
demonstrate, however, that this perception is flawed. Evidence rules
are not marginal: their effect on the outcomes of court decisions is
profound. More importantly, a regime that provides factfinders with
unregulated discretion poses a serious constitutional problem.
Allowing factfinders to apportion informational risks as they deem fit
undercuts the Supreme Court's agenda for risk-allocation by
procedural and decisionmaking rules. Factfinders can foil this agenda
by manipulating informational risks. This anti-constitutional prospect
calls for the constitutionalization of evidence law.
This call is purely normative in nature. As such, it does not
consider the effects of federalism and constitutional culture. These
effects are introduced in Part III, which develops a positive account of
the informal constitutionalization of evidence. This account identifies
three dynamics: constitutional d6tente, constitutional culture, and
federal safe harbors. These dynamics involve implicit, but entirely
credible, understandings between the Supreme Court and state courts
about the permissible scope of state evidence rules. According to these
understandings, state courts must never openly defy the Court's
agenda for risk-allocation. While they can deviate from this agenda to
protect local interests, they must use evidence rules that have low
visibility so as not to undermine the Court's constitutional authority.
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Finally, a state rule's alignment with a federal rule of evidence
guarantees its constitutionality.
I. THE LANDSCAPE OF CONSTITUTIONAL TRIAL RULES
Constitutional trial rules" control two domains: procedure and
decisionmaking. This Part of the Article examines these rules and
their underlying motivation. The constitutional validity of court
procedures and decisional rules, formulated as burdens of proof,
depends on the risk of error and the consequent harm. Constitutional
rules of procedure and decision aim to minimize net harm from an
erroneous case disposition. The greater the potential harm, the
stricter the procedural and decisional requirements authorizing the
denial of a person's liberty or property. This "least harm principle"
animates the Supreme Court's constitutional requirements for
procedures and decisions in both criminal and civil trials. In the
domain of procedure, these requirements control the allocation of
participatory risks by the rules of trial management. In the domain of

11. Trial rules are provisions that regulate processes of proof and argumentation in trials.
Rules that control pre-trial matters such as arrest, bail, interrogation, and a grand jury review of
criminal charges are not trial rules. The Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a speedy and public
criminal trial before an impartial jury and the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in civil
actions at common law also do not count as trial rules. Rather, these constitutional provisions
are about the trial's format. They set no requirements with respect to proof and argumentation.
Furthermore, trial rules do not include the Fourth Amendment's protections against searches
and seizures or the exclusionary rule that remedies violations of these protections. See Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655-60 (1961) (articulating the scope and purpose of the Fourth
Amendment's exclusionary rule as applicable to the states). The Supreme Court's constitutional
jurisprudence explicitly separates these prophylactic protections from defendants' trial rights.
See Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 688 (1993) (explaining that the Fourth Amendment's
exclusionary rule is not a trial right); Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 374 (1986) (same).
The constitutional rules that suppress coerced confessions, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964);
Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542-45 (1897), and confessions elicited during custodial
interrogations in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), are different. Based on the
Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination and, in the case of coerced confessions,
also on the general due process requirement, Withrow, 507 U.S. at 693; Colorado v. Connelly, 479
U.S. 157, 163 (1986), these rules serve a dual purpose. Primarily, they deter police misconduct in
interrogations. See Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540-41 (1961) (explaining that suppression
of coerced confessions is driven primarily by the need to prevent improper inquisitorial methods
of interrogation, as opposed to a concern that "such confessions are unlikely to be true"). But they
also guard against the use of unreliable confessions at trial and for that reason can be
categorized as trial rules. See Withrow, 507 U.S. at 691-92 ("Mirandasafeguards a 'fundamental
trial right.' "). This categorization would be untidy, though. The primary focus of the Fifth
Amendment's exclusionary rule and its "due process" addition for coerced confessions is not
confession evidence as such, but rather confessions obtained by police misconduct. This rule
regulates a highly limited segment of the informational risk. I therefore do not include it in my
account of constitutional trial rules. Adding it to the list would not change anything in my
analysis anyway.
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decisionmaking, they regulate the imposition of decisional risks by the
rules allocating the burden of proof. These requirements reflect the
Court's choices between false positives (errors favoring the prosecution
and plaintiffs) and false negatives (errors favoring defendants). The
constitutional status of these choices protects people from decisions of
lawmakers and judges that favor a different allocation of the risk of
error.
This Part of the Article also identifies a domain that receives
no such protection-rules of evidential adequacy that determine which
evidence is admissible and which evidence requires corroboration. By
setting requirements for evidential adequacy, evidence rules allocate
informational risks to one party or the other. Constitutional law steps
in to invalidate such a rule only in extreme cases that exhibit
"fundamental unfairness."
As with participatory and decisional risks, informational risks
result in erroneous verdicts that deprive people of their liberties and
properties. Evidence rules, therefore, are operationally identical to the
risk-allocating procedures and decisions that need to align with the
Constitution. However, because evidence rules only need to avoid
"fundamental unfairness," by devising rules of evidence, legislators
and judges can skew the informational risks in a way that subverts
the Supreme Court's constitutional agenda for participatory and
decisional risks. The Constitution's checkerboard protection against
risks of error therefore presents a puzzle for legal theory and a
legitimacy problem for the practice of the law. What can possibly
explain and justify the constitutional indifference towards
informational risks alongside the expansive constitutional regulation
of participatory and decisional risks? Why not treat the three risks
similarly?
A. The ProtectedDomains:Procedure and Decision

1. Procedure
Constitutional rules of procedure determine a person's power to
participate in her trial. This power enables a person to adduce
evidence that supports her allegations and that challenges the
allegations of her adversary. 12 The participatory power protects a
person from being abused by a bad judge, an overzealous prosecutor,
12. See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1.4, at 28 (4th ed. 2004)
(explaining that in an adversary system each party "is expected to present the facts ... in a light
most favorable to its side, and.., challenge the.., presentations made by the other side").
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and an unscrupulous adversary.13 However, it also enables a person to
14
abuse her adversary and the trial process by distorting the truth.
The power therefore requires a counterbalance: the participatory
rights must be apportioned equitably between the parties. This
apportionment still does not neutralize the parties' potentials for
truth-distortion. Rather, it enables each party to impose the same
amount of risk of error on her opponent. This mutual imposition of
risks may be good for some cases, but not for others.
As a normative matter, apportionment of participatory risks
depends on morality. Under the prevalent moral vision, equal
apportionment of participatory risks is suitable for ordinary civil
adjudication. There, adjudicators have no special reason for erring in
favor of the plaintiff instead of the defendant, or vice versa: false
positives are as harmful as false negatives. 15 In criminal trials,
however, things are markedly different. Under the prevalent moral
vision, it is better to acquit a guilty defendant than to convict and
punish an innocent person. 16 This preference requires an
asymmetrical allocation of participatory risks--one that gives
defendants more participatory power than the prosecution.
The Supreme Court's willingness to protect the accused from
risk
of erroneous conviction 17 defines the constitutional design of
the
the participatory power for criminal defendants. A defendant's right to
confrontation gives her the power to cross-examine any person
testifying against her interest.1 8 Testimonial evidence is admissible
only when the defendant has an opportunity to cross-examine its
provider, a witness or an out-of-court declarant. 19 The concept of
13. Id.; see also JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIL PROCEDURE § 1.1, at 2-3 (4th ed. 2005)
(indicating that in civil trials litigants "control and shape the litigation," while the court
maintains a "passive role").
14. See Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence Between the Private and the Social
Motive to Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 575 (1997).
15. See Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991) (applying the "preponderance-of-theevidence standard" because it "results in a roughly equal allocation of the risk of error between
litigants"); see also STEIN, supra note 8, at 219-44 (describing the equality principle for allocating
risk of error and its effect on civil litigation).
16. 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 341, at 491 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 6th ed. 2006); see also
STEIN, supra note 8, at 172-83 (offering an account of the criminal burden of proof as securing
the legal system's alignment with the "equal best" standard).
17. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 369-72 (1970) (holding in a foundational
ruling that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is constitutionally required in all criminal trials);
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958) (stating that avoidance of erroneous convictions
has "transcending value").
18. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 16, § 252, at 155-65
(describing confrontation rights).
19. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004); see also California v. Green, 399 U.S.
149, 164 (1970) (holding that admission of a witness's prior statement inconsistent with his trial

2008]

CONSTITUTIONAL EVIDENCE LAW

"testimonial" is crucial to a defendant's entitlement to confrontation. 20
To qualify as testimonial, a person's factual account must be delivered
in court or in another formal proceeding, such as a police
interrogation. 21 The defendant's entitlement to confrontation does not
attach to statements unaffiliated with a formal proceeding, 22 a victim's
cry for help, for example. 23 Informal "event statements," 24 however,
may still constitute admissible hearsay. 25 If so, admission of such
statement must rely on a recognized exception to the rule against
hearsay. 26 Until very recently, the exception also had to satisfy the
Constitution's demand for confrontation. To satisfy that demand, the
27
exception had to be "firmly rooted" in the common law of evidence.
Alternatively, a statement cleared as evidence against the defendant
ought to have exhibited "adequate indicia of reliability," 28 and the
testimony does not violate the Confrontation Clause when the defendant can cross-examine the
witness).
20. The differentiation between "testimonial" and "event" statements originates from the
disparity of power between the defendant and the government. Testimonial statements are
controllable by government agents who may put pressure on a witness to induce him to testify in
accordance with their wishes. Event statements have no such potential for generating injustice
and therefore do not require heightened constitutional scrutiny. STEIN, supra note 8, at 189-96.
For foundational analysis, see Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for Basic
Principles,86 GEO. L.J. 1011, 1014-22 (1998).
21. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
22. Id.; see also Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2273 (2006) (reaffirming that
Crawford does not apply to statements made outside formal proceedings).
23. See Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2273-74 (holding that the Confrontation Clause protects
defendants against statements made in interrogations aiming to collect evidence for criminal
prosecutions, but not against statements to an agency attending an ongoing emergency). The
defendant also may forfeit his right to confrontation by committing a wrongdoing that prevents
the maker of an inculpatory testimonial statement from testifying as a witness at his trial. Id. at
2280 (stating that "one who obtains the absence of a witness by wrongdoing forfeits the
constitutional right to confrontation," and explaining that "forfeiture by wrongdoing . . .
extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially equitable grounds" (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S.
at 62, and citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158-59 (1879)).
24. See STEIN, supra note 8, at 190 (defining "event statements" as "any statement that the
declarant makes... during any event outside of legal proceedings").
25. See FED. R. EVID. 801(c) (defining as presumptively inadmissible hearsay any out-ofcourt statement aiming to "prove the truth of the matter asserted"); 2 MCCORMICK, supra note
16, § 246, at 128-31 (explaining the definition of hearsay).
26. See FED. R. EVID. 802 (prescribing that a hearsay statement is admissible only under a
recognized exception to the rule against hearsay); 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 16, § 245, at 127-28
(explaining this principle).
27. See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 817 (1990) ("Admission under a firmly rooted
hearsay exception satisfies the constitutional requirement of reliability .. ");Bourjaily v.
United States, 483 U.S. 171, 183 (1987) (same); 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 16, § 252, at 160
(describing the case law that led the Court to conclude that statements admissible under "firmly
rooted" hearsay exceptions have sufficient "indicia of reliability").
28. Wright, 497 U.S. at 814-15; Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980), overruled in part by
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
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person who made it had to be unavailable as a witness at the
defendant's trial.29 However, two recent Supreme Court dicta seem to
remove completely the defendants' constitutional protection against
30
non-testimonial inculpatory statements.
Additionally, criminal defendants are entitled to compulsory
31
process-a right that gives a defendant the power to call witnesses
and demand the production of documents and physical evidence for
trial. 32 To this end, the defendant can mobilize the formal subpoena
mechanism. 33 The compulsory process requirement imposes on the
government an affirmative duty to facilitate the defendant's effort to
obtain evidence that may exonerate her. Discovery rules that exist
under the Due Process Clause 34 protect the defendant's right to obtain
such evidence. Under the basic discovery rule laid down in Brady v.
Maryland, the defendant is entitled to receive from the prosecution
not only the evidence that may be used against her at trial, but also
any evidence that may have exculpating potential. 35 The suppression
of exculpatory evidence, both willful and inadvertent, violates due
process 36 and voids the defendant's conviction.3 7 A rule that works in
29. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 74 (defining "unavailable" for purposes of the confrontation
requirement); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724-25 (1968) (holding that to establish a declarant's
"unavailability," prosecution must show substantial effort to secure his attendance as a witness).
30. In Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2274, Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, explained that
testimonial hearsay defines not only the core of the Confrontation Clause protection, but also the
protection's parameters. In a more recent decision, Whorton v. Bockting, 127 S. Ct. 1173, 1183
(2007), Justice Alito, writing for the Court, opined:
[W]hatever improvement in reliability Crawford produced must be considered
together with Crawfords elimination of Confrontation Clause protection against the
Under Roberts, an
admission of unreliable out-of-court nontestimonial statements ....
out-of-court nontestimonial statement not subject to prior cross-examination could not
be admitted without a judicial determination regarding reliability. Under Crawford,
on the other hand, the Confrontation Clause has no application to such statements
and therefore permits their admission even if they lack indicia of reliability.
For analysis of these pronouncements and their implications, see Laird C. Kirkpatrick,
Nontestimonial HearsayAfter Crawford, Davis and Bockting, 19 REGENT U. L. REV. 367 (2007).
31. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 22-23 (1967) (holding that a statute disqualifying
accomplice testimony as evidence for defendant violates the Compulsory Process Clause). The
defendant's right to call witnesses and produce evidence is also guaranteed under the Due
Process Clause. See Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324 (2006) (noting that the
Constitution guarantees criminal defendants "a meaningful opportunity to present a complete
defense" (quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984), and citing Crane v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986))).
32. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 12, § 24.3, at 1127-28 (describing uses of a court's
subpoena power to compel the production of evidence or witness testimony).
33. Id.
34. See id. at 1128-30 (outlining the constitutional rights of defendants to assistance in
obtaining evidence).
35. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
36. Id.
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tandem with Brady provides that even a faultless destruction or
suppression of material exculpatory evidence by police or prosecution
mandates acquittal. 38 There is also a special rule that applies in cases
in which police or the prosecution maliciously suppresses or destroys
evidence potentially useful to the defendant. The normal consequence
of such misconduct is acquittal; the court need not even examine the
potential probative value of the evidence maliciously suppressed or
39
destroyed.
Finally, the right to counsel strongly enhances the defendant's
participatory power. This right allows a criminal defendant to appoint
an attorney to represent her throughout the legal process. 40 A
defendant who is unable to pay attorneys' fees normally is entitled to a
counsel at the government's expense. 41 The right to counsel is
understood as incorporating the attorney-client privilege, 42 which
protects the confidentiality of the defendant's communications with
her attorney and any additional information generated by the
attorney's work. 43 The right to counsel also protects the defendant
from ineffective assistance of counsel. 44 This right attaches not only to
46
criminal trials and preliminary hearings, 45 but also to police lineups
after the defendant has been charged.4 7 Failure to honor the right
37. Id. at 88-89; see also Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999) (summarizing
essential components of a Brady violation).
38. See Illinois v. Fisher, 540 U.S. 544, 547 (2004) (per curiam) (finding that the defendant
could not be acquitted automatically because the destroyed evidence was only "potentially
useful," as opposed to "materially exculpatory").
39. See Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988).
40. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153 (1988) (holding that the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel encompasses the right to choose one's attorney); see also United States v. GonzalezLopez, 126 S. Ct. 2557, 2564-66 (2006) (holding that denial of defendant's right to choose an
attorney warrants reversal of conviction).
41. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
42. See, e.g., Black v. United States, 385 U.S. 26, 28-29 (1966) (per curiam) (remanding the
case for a new trial as a result of a finding that government agents monitored confidential
communications between defendant and his attorney); Williams v. Woodford, 306 F.3d 665, 683
(9th Cir. 2002) (holding that government interference in a defendant's confidential relationship
with his attorney violates the Sixth Amendment); United States v. Castor, 937 F.2d 293, 297 (7th
Cir. 1991) (same); Clutchette v. Rushen, 770 F.2d 1469, 1472 (9th Cir. 1985) (same); United
States v. Rosner, 485 F.2d 1213, 1224 (2d Cir. 1973) (holding that privacy in a defendant's
communications with his attorney is "the essence of the Sixth Amendment right").
43. 1 MCCORMICK, supra note 16, § 89, at 401, § 96, at 434-40.
44. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691-92 (1984) (explaining the rule that
ineffective assistance of counsel voids a defendant's conviction).
45. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 6 (1970).
46. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236-37 (1967).
47. See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972) (holding that the right to counsel attaches
"at or after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings-whether by way of formal
charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment").
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generally leads to a reversal of the defendant's conviction. 48
Furthermore, the exclusionary rule suppresses any evidence that the
49
government obtains pursuant to the right's violation.
Constitutional criminal procedure does not give the prosecution
similar participatory powers. The prosecution, for example, cannot
invoke the right to cross-examination in order to block the admission
of defense evidence. 50 The Constitution might mandate the admission
of exculpatory evidence even when it constitutes inadmissible
hearsay.5 1 The prosecution can only block the admission of patently
unreliable and prejudicial defense evidence. 52 For example, the
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a rule preventing the
admission of a polygraph examination of the defendant's selfexonerating account. 53 As a general matter, exclusion of defense
evidence is constitutional only if it serves a "legitimate interest"54 and
is not "disproportionate to the ends that [it is] asserted to promote." 55
The prosecution also cannot force the defendant to testify and
be cross-examined at trial. The Fifth Amendment's privilege against
self-incrimination permits defendants not to testify. The Supreme
Court also has interpreted this privilege as prohibiting the prosecution
from commenting to the factfinders on the defendant's silence. 56 This

48. See Wade, 388 U.S. at 239-42 (discussing the rationale for reversal based on pretrial
lineup evidence having been obtained without counsel present, but also noting exceptions).
49. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398-406 (1977) (affirming application of the
exclusionary rule as a remedy for violation of the right to counsel).
50. The rights to present evidence and confront witnesses under U.S. CONST. amend. VI are
given to the accused, not to the prosecution.
51. See Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324, 331 (2006) (holding that state rule
blocking admission of exculpatory hearsay violates defendant's rights to due process, compulsory
process, and confrontation).
52. Id. at 326 ("While the Constitution... prohibits the exclusion of defense evidence under
rules that serve no legitimate purpose or that are disproportionate to the ends that they are
asserted to promote, well-established rules of evidence permit trial judges to exclude evidence if
its probative value is outweighed by certain other factors such as unfair prejudice, confusion of
the issues, or potential to mislead the jury.").
53. See United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 305, 309 (1998) (upholding the
constitutionality of a military rule blocking the admission of polygraph evidence, and justifying
this decision in part by the questionable reliability of polygraphs).
54. Id. at 308.
55. Holmes, 547 U.S. at 326; see also Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 61 (1987) (pronouncing
unconstitutional Arkansas's rule that excluded hypnotically refreshed testimony because
"wholesale inadmissibility of a defendant's testimony is an arbitrary restriction on the right to
testify in the absence of clear evidence by the State repudiating the validity of all posthypnosis
recollections").
56. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617-18 (1976) (interpreting the Fifth Amendment as
prohibiting adverse inferences from and prosecutorial comments on defendant's silence at
custodial interrogation); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965) (interpreting the Fifth
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restriction of the prosecution's participatory power is both substantial
and one-sided. 57 Asymmetrical application of the attorney-client
privilege intensifies this nonreciprocal allocation of participatory
risks. As previously noted, this privilege protects the defendant's selfincriminating communications to her attorney. It does not, however,
protect exculpatory information possessed by police or the prosecution.
The police cannot make such information privileged, for example, by
communicating it to a government attorney.5 8 Nor can the government
withhold exculpatory information on state secrecy grounds. 59 The
defendant is entitled to receive from the prosecution all exculpatory
60
information, so long as the prosecution presses the charges.
All this skews participatory risks in the criminal defendant's
favor. The defendant's ability to distort the truth at her trial by
pretending to be innocent is consequently greater than the
prosecution's ability to frame him. 61 This allocation of participatory
risks is socially beneficial, as it reduces the potential for erroneous
conviction. But it also works to society's detriment by giving
defendants more opportunity to obtain an erroneous acquittal.
Amendment as prohibiting adverse inferences from and prosecutorial comments on defendant's
silence at trial).
57. This privilege affords special protection to innocent defendants who find themselves
unable to corroborate their self-exonerating accounts by objective evidence. Without it, guilty
criminals would be incentivized to pool with innocents by making false exculpatory statements
(to the extent they believe that their lies are unlikely to be exposed). Aware of these criminals'
incentives, factfinders would rationally discount the probative value of all uncorroborated
exculpatory statements, to the detriment of the unfortunate innocents who cannot corroborate
their true statements. The Fifth Amendment privilege minimizes this pooling effect and
correspondingly reduces the rate of wrongful convictions. Under this regime, rational innocents
still tell the truth, whereas criminals-fearful of being implicated by their lies-separate from
the pool by exercising the right to silence. See Daniel Seidmann & Alex Stein, The Right to
Silence Helps the Innocent: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Fifth Amendment Privilege, 114
HARv. L. REV. 430 (2000); see also STEIN, supra note 8, at 164 n.82 (responding to critics of this
anti-pooling rationalization).
58. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 12, § 20.3, at 938-40 (stating that prosecution generally
is not entitled to the "work product" protection except for statements of opinion documenting
mental impressions of its legal staff).
59. Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 671-72 (1957).
60. See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 12 (1953) ("[in criminal cases] the
Government can invoke its evidentiary privileges only at the price of letting the defendant go
free."); United States v. Andolschek, 142 F.2d 503, 506 (2nd Cir. 1944) ("The government must
choose; either it must leave the transactions in the obscurity from which a trial will draw them,
or it must expose them fully."). But a private person's communication to his attorney stays
privileged despite its exonerating potential for a criminal defendant even after the person's
death. See Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 410 (1998) ("It has been generally, if
not universally, accepted, for well over a century, that the attorney-client privilege survives the
death of the client in a case such as this.").
61. Before trial, however, the excessive investigative and prosecutorial powers make a
person particularly exposed to governmental abuse.
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In civil litigation, the constitutional baseline for apportioning
participatory risks is equality. The baseline functions as a default
rule. Reasoned deviations from this rule withstand constitutional
scrutiny. Under this system, a litigant's right to participate in her
trial is constitutionally protected. Based on the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, 62 the Supreme Court interprets this
protection to include a litigant's right to present evidence, to examine
63
the evidence of her opponent, and to be represented by an attorney.
Dissimilarly to criminal cases, there is no constitutional demand for
discovery of information. The government also has no constitutional
64
obligation to provide free legal representation to the poor.
The scope of participatory rights in civil litigation is
determined by the balancing formula of Mathews v. Eldridge, which
focuses on the risk of factfinding error. 65 Under this formula, the scope
of participatory rights depends on three factors: harm resulting from
an erroneous disposition of the case under the procedures actually
used, the utility of the additional or substitute participatory
safeguards, and the social cost of those safeguards. 66 According to
Mathews, due process demands that adjudicative procedures minimize
not only the cost of errors in decisions, but also the cost of avoiding
errors. 67 The total sum of those costs must be minimized. Any
enhancement of a person's participatory rights consequently must be
more productive than costly. The enhancement's productivity is
measured by the amount by which it reduces the aggregate social cost
of false positives and false negatives. The enhancement's cost equals
62. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
63. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 523, 532 (2004) (interpreting the Due Process
Clause as requiring States, "within the limits of practicability," to "afford certain civil litigants a
'meaningful opportunity to be heard' by removing obstacles to their full participation in judicial
proceedings" (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971))); Connecticut v. Doehr,
501 U.S. 1, 18 (1991) (holding that due process may require an adjudicative hearing to justify
deprivation of property rights). The rights enumerated in the text are included in the
constitutional entitlements to hearing (under Doehr) and participation (under Boddie and Lane).
These decisions make constitutional civil procedure more meaningful than it was two and a half
decades ago. Cf. John Leubsdorf, ConstitutionalCivil Procedure, 63 TEX. L. REV. 579, 582 (1984)
(analyzing the then-existing constitutional jurisprudence and observing that it "does not
influence civil procedure even when constitutional principles are plainly relevant").
64. See Bass v. Perrin, 170 F.3d 1312, 1320 (11th Cir. 1999) ("A plaintiff in a civil case has
no constitutional right to counsel."); see also Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 23 (1956)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("[A] State need not equalize economic conditions.").
65. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Devised originally for administrative hearings, the Mathews
doctrine also applies in civil litigation. See Doehr, 501 U.S. at 10-11 (applying the Mathews
analysis to the burden created by a prejudgment remedy statute that "ordinarily appl[ies] to
disputes between private parties rather than between an individual and the government").
66. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
67. Id. at 344.
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the difference between the costs of adjudication with and without it.
This balancing applies to categories of cases rather than to any
68
individual case.
Under this framework, violation of due process can occur only
when the social saving from curtailing a person's participatory power
is far below the expected harm to that person. When the saving is
substantial enough, the curtailment withstands constitutional
scrutiny. As a general matter, curtailment of participatory power
passes constitutional muster when it restricts both parties equally. 69
2. Decision
Constitutional trial rules regulate decisional risks by allocating
burdens of proof. This allocation sets the standards of proof for factual
findings and determines the consequences of a party's failure to
satisfy the controlling proof standard.
For criminal convictions, constitutional due process generally
requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt.70 Under this requirement,
the jury's finding of a reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant
committed the crime must lead to an acquittal. 71 The judge must
instruct jurors to decide the case by this standard, 72 and in the
explanation, she must explain the meaning of "beyond a reasonable
doubt" in simple words that an average juror can understand. 73 The
same standard controls post-conviction decisions of trial judges and
appellate courts. The success of a post-conviction challenge of a guilty
verdict depends on whether a rational juror could find beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he
is accused. When the answer to this question is "yes," both the trial

68. Id.
69. See, e.g., Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 446-47 (1962) (underscoring courts'
"duty to assure to the greatest degree possible... equal treatment for every litigant before the
bar"); see also Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative
Adjudication in Matthews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L.
REV. 28, 52 (1976) ("[Ilnsofar as adjudicatory procedure is perceived to be adversarial and
dispute resolving, the degree to which procedures facilitate equal opportunities for the
adversaries to influence the decision may be the most important criterion by which fairness is
evaluated.").
70. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
71. Id.
72. Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5 (1994).
73. See id. at 6 (stating that, when assessing the constitutionality of a judge's instructions
regarding the reasonable doubt standard, the key question is "whether there is a reasonable
likelihood that the jury understood the instructions to allow conviction based on proof
insufficient to meet the ...

standard").
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judge and the appellate court must affirm the conviction. 74 Criminal
convictions thus require a very high, although numerically unstated,
probability of guilt. 75 This requirement allows many guilty defendants
to go free in the interest of not convicting the innocent. 76 And the
requirement's constitutional entrenchment prevents legislative and
judicial attempts to whittle it down.
This protection from the risk of erroneous conviction does not
extend to affirmative defenses, such as duress, necessity, or insanity,
which exonerate, or reduce the culpability of, an otherwise guilty
defendant. 77 Defendants can benefit from these defenses even when all
the elements of the crime are proven beyond all reasonable doubt.
This feature makes affirmative defenses both special and
constitutionally unnecessary. Because states and Congress may
choose not to recognize these defenses, they are allowed to condition
the availability of any such defense on its proof by the defendant.
Consequently, lawmakers can require defendants to establish any
affirmative defense by preponderance of the evidence, 78 by clear and
convincing proof,79 or even beyond a reasonable doubt.80 The defense,
however, needs to be genuinely affirmative: it must not overlap any
81
element of the crime.

74. E.g., Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 401 (1993) (stating that, in a habeas corpus
petition, the appellate court must not reverse the conviction unless it finds that the evidence at
petitioner's trial was not sufficient to convince any rational trier of fact of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt).
75. See STEIN, supra note 8, at 172-73 (describing a formula capturing the utility-based
criminal proof standard and observing that the "conventional doctrine ... vigorously resists the
explicit introduction of numbers into the ...

formula").

76. See 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 16, § 341, at 490-91 ("[In applying the stringent 'beyond a
reasonable doubt' standard,] courts may have increased the total number of mistaken decisions
in criminal cases, but with the worthy goal of decreasing the number of one kind of mistakeconviction of the innocent.").
77. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 208 (1977) (upholding the constitutionality of
a statute requiring defendants to prove an affirmative defense by a preponderance of the
evidence).
78. As in Patterson. Id.; see also Dixon v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2437, 2447-48 (2006)
(requiring defendants relying on duress as an affirmative defense to prove it by a preponderance
of the evidence).
79. See Clark v. Arizona, 126 S. Ct. 2709, 2717, 2732 (2006) (recognizing that a state may
require defendants to prove insanity by clear and convincing evidence).
80. As in Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 798 (1952), in which the court upheld the
constitutionality of an Oregon statute requiring defendants to prove the insanity defense beyond
a reasonable doubt.
81. See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE 137 (3d ed. 2003)
("If the factor... is an element in the offense, the prosecutor must bear the burden of persuasion
beyond a reasonable doubt. If it is a 'new matter' affirmative defense that can coexist with all the
elements of the offense.., then the burden of persuasion can be put on the defendant."). For
analysis of the nature and objectives of the special proof requirements that attach to affirmative
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For civil trials, the default proof standard is a preponderance of
the evidence.8 2 Under this standard, adjudicators must deem a factual
allegation proven when it is more probable than not. The Supreme
Court treats this standard as a constitutional benchmark because it
makes parties to a civil action "share the risk of error in roughly equal
fashion."8 3 The Court also recognizes an array of social interests that
justify deviations from the default standard of equal apportionment of
the risk of error.8 4 Any plausible rationale for departing from the
preponderance standard must pass constitutional muster.8 5 This
rationale may be an anti-euthanasia policy,8 6 a welfare program,8 7 or
virtually any other plausible goal. The Court has emphasized that
"[o]utside the criminal law area, where special concerns attend, the
locus of the burden of persuasion normally is not an issue of federal
88
constitutional moment."
For civil cases in which a citizen faces the prospect of being
deprived of a fundamental liberty, the traditional constitutional proof
standard is "clear and convincing" evidence.8 9 This standard is higher
than a preponderance of the evidence, but not as onerous as "beyond a
reasonable doubt."90 The Supreme Court has attached this standard to
deportation 91 and denaturalization 92 proceedings, as well as to
decisions that commit a person to a mental institution. 93 This
standard also controls actions for terminating parental rights. 94 The
cause for terminating those rights-typically, parental neglect of the
defenses, see Richard A. Bierschbach & Alex Stein, Mediating Rules in Criminal Law, 93 VA. L.
REV. 1197, 1241-52 (2007).
82. Grogan v. Gartner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991).
83. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979).
84. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 81, at 109 (stating that the preponderance
standard applies across the board in civil cases, but listing a wide variety of situations in which a
higher "clear and convincing evidence" standard may be used).
85. See Lavine v. Milne, 424 U.S. 577, 587 (1976).
86. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 280 (1990) (holding that due
process does not forbid states from requiring clear and convincing evidence as a proof of patient's
wish for the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment).
87. As in Lavine, 424 U.S. at 578-79.
88. Id. at 587; see also Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 63-64 (2001) (holding that "[t]he
Constitution ... does not require that Congress elect one particular mechanism from among
many possible methods of establishing paternity" for citizenship purposes).
89. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 431-33 (1979).
90. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 282-83 (recognizing the need for an intermediate standard of
proof); Addington, 441 U.S. at 424-25 (discussing the relationship between "clear and convincing"
and other standards of proof).
91. Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276 (1966).
92. Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 125, 159 (1943).
93. Addington, 441 U.S. at 425-27.
94. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 768-70 (1982).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:1:65

child-needs to be established by clear and convincing evidence. 95
Finally, in a libel action brought by a public figure, the publisher's
malice-a prerequisite to the plaintiffs recovery of tort damages-also
96
must be established by clear and convincing evidence.
These rulings fit into the Mathews formulation of
constitutional due process. 97 Under this formulation, the proof
standard must track the net harm from the erroneous denial of a
person's substantive right. 98 The greater the harm, the higher the
proof requirement authorizing its infliction. Constitutional law thus
tells the plaintiff: "If the defendant and you had a quarrel over money
or property-so that the risks of an erroneous disposition of the case
were equally bad for both sides-the controlling proof standard would
have been preponderance. But you want to take away the defendant's
fundamental right without risking an equivalent right of your own.
The risks of error, therefore, are not the same for you and for the
defendant, and your evidence consequently must be considerablyrather than just slightly-more compelling than hers."99
B. The "Least Harm Principle" ConstitutionalProtections
Against Risks of Error
Constitutional rules of procedure and decision have a unifying
rationale. Allocation of the risk of error has far-reaching
consequences. Adjudicators allocate this risk in every case. How the
risk is allocated affects whether a person is deprived of liberty and
property-whether criminal defendants go to prison despite being
innocent, and whether parties to civil lawsuits are deprived of money
95. Id. at 747-48.
96. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 510 (1991) (holding that a
publisher's right to due process, which attaches to its constitutional entitlement to free speech,
means that maliciousness of its libelous publication must be proven by clear and convincing
evidence); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255-56 (1986) (same).
97. See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
98. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). For critical analysis of this doctrine, see
Mashaw, supra note 69, at 46-52, in which the court criticized the Mathews formula for dwarfing
"soft variables" that include a person's dignity and autonomy).
99. This rationalization carries the "clear and convincing" standard into many new
domains. For example, an action for revoking a doctor's license to practice medicine might
necessitate the imposition of the "clear and convincing" requirement on due process grounds. See
Nguyen v. Wash. Dept. of Health Med. Quality Assurance Comm., 29 P.3d 689, 697 (Wash. 2001)
(imposing on due process grounds the "clear and convincing" requirement on a proceeding for
removal of a doctor's license); see also Roy G. Spece, Jr. & John J. Marchalonis, Sound
Constitutional Analysis, Moral Principle, and Wise Policy Judgment Require a Clear and
Convincing Evidence Standard of Proof in PhysicianDisciplinaryProceedings,3 IND. HEALTH L.

REV. 107 (2006) (arguing that the "clear and convincing" standard is constitutionally required in
disciplinary actions against doctors).
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or property that belong to them. Because people do not fully trust
legislators and judges, they seek constitutional protection for their
liberties and properties. They receive this protection from the
constitutional rules regulating court procedures and burdens of proof.
These rules determine the constitutionally favored allocation of
participatory and decisional risks. This allocation reduces the total
harm from erroneous denials of substantive rights-subject to costs:
the cost of adjudicative procedures and decisions must not exceed the
harm that they prevent. The totality of constitutional rules regulating
procedures and burdens of proof thus can be conceptualized as the
"least harm principle."
Under this principle, the constitutional validity of adjudicative
procedures and decisional rules depends on the risk of error and the
resulting harm. A procedure or a rule of decision that exposes a person
to an excessive risk of error fails the test for constitutionality. The key
question, of course, is what risks of error-participatory and
decisional-count as excessive.
The answer depends on social morality. Under the prevalent
moral vision, the conviction and punishment of an innocent person is
considered particularly harmful.100 A wrongly convicted person suffers
from punishment and stigmatization. Her physical harm, however,
does not by itself warrant special protection of the innocent. Because
this harm is comparable to that of crime victims, its infliction can be
justified as a measure necessary for intensifying deterrence: the
prevention of crime victims' suffering often offsets the suffering of a
wrongly convicted defendant. But wrongful conviction and
punishment also degrade the convicted person by making her a means
for attaining society's goals. This instrumentalization inflicts on the
convicted person a substantial moral harm: it devalues her life,
relative to that of other citizens. 10 1 To minimize this moral harm,
constitutional doctrine provides that a person only can be convicted
when her guilt is proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
"Beyond a reasonable doubt" does not mean beyond any doubt.
The prevalent moral vision distinguishes between erroneous
convictions that are accidental and wrongful convictions that are
deliberate.1 0 2 By drawing this distinction, it underscores that it is one
thing to convict an innocent person accidentally, when there are no
evidence-based reasons for doubting her guilt, but quite another to
convict an innocent person by knowingly disregarding such a reason.
100. See RONALD DWORKIN, A MA1rER OF PRINCIPLE 79-89 (1986) (explicating this vision).
101. Id. at 81-84.
102. Id. at 84-88.
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The first case is just a misfortune; the second constitutes an injustice.
The first case involves bad luck that may befall any person. The
second involves a deliberate, and therefore unjust, sacrifice of an
individual for the good of society, a sacrifice that violates equality and
fairness.'0 3 Under this vision, the state may convict a person of a
crime and make her eligible for punishment when it satisfies two
conditions. The state must do its best to protect the person from the
risk of erroneous conviction, and it must not provide better protection
10 4
to other individuals.
This "equal best" standard branches into a set of constitutional
requirements that minimize the net amount of harm from erroneous
dispositions of criminal cases. Under one such requirement, the
prosecution must eliminate every possibility of the defendant's
innocence that arises from the evidence. This is what "proof beyond a
reasonable doubt" means.'0 5 The "equal best" standard also requires
that defendants have an adequate opportunity to obtain and present
10 6
exculpatory evidence.
Any rule that increases the factual accuracy of an adjudicative
determination of guilt correspondingly decreases the factual accuracy
of an adjudicative determination of innocence. 10 7 The "equal best"
standard does exactly that. It greatly increases the chances that a
convicted defendant will have committed the crime in question and
greatly decreases the chances that innocent people will be found
guilty. By the same token, this standard greatly increases the chances
that factually guilty defendants will be exonerated. By decreasing the
incidence of false positives, the "equal best" standard increases the
incidence of false negatives.
In the civil litigation area, society's valuation of the harms is
different. The harm that a plaintiff sustains when her claim is denied
erroneously is generally perceived as equal to the harm that a

103. Id.
104. See STEIN, supra note 8, at 172-78 (articulating the "equal best" standard as an
organizing principle for existing protections against erroneous conviction).
105. Id. at 173-74; see also PAUL ROBERTS & ADRIAN A.S. ZUCKERMAN, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE
360-66 (2004) (articulating the meaning of "beyond a reasonable doubt").
106. See supra notes 31-39 and accompanying text.
107. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 618 n.2 (6th ed. 2003)
(observing that "trading off Type I and Type II errors is a pervasive feature of evidence law");
STEIN, supra note 8, at 172-78 ("The legal system can . . .reduce the incidence of wrongful
acquittals ('false negatives') by increasing the number of wrongful convictions ('false positives'),
and vice versa.").

2008]

CONSTITUTIONAL EVIDENCE LAW

defendant suffers when the plaintiffs claim is granted erroneously. 108
This equality of the harms dictates that the rules of procedure and
decision do not favor either party. In other words, these rules must be
unbiased. They ought to ensure that the plaintiff and the defendant
are both equally protected from, and equally exposed to, the risk of
error. 10 9 This risk-equalizing standard explains the existing rules of
discovery, subpoena, witness examination, and other trial and pretrial mechanisms. This standard also justifies the preponderance
requirement, under which a party whose evidence is more convincing
than that of her adversary prevails at trial. 110 Courts and legislators
may deviate from the equality standard only on special policy
grounds. 1'

The Supreme Court's constitutional jurisprudence also has
established the "heightened protection" standard. 112 Its primary
13
manifestation is the "clear and convincing evidence" requirement.
As previously explained, this requirement attaches to actions that
deny a person's civil liberty or other fundamental right. For such
actions, constitutional doctrine also prescribes a number of procedural
enhancements that solidify a person's protection from the risk of error.
Courts achieve this protection by expanding the person's participatory
power. 114
In sum, the "least harm principle" explains three sets of
constitutional requirements for adjudicative procedures and decisions.
The first set includes the requirements for procedures and decisions in
criminal adjudication. These requirements generally align with the
"equal best" standard. The second set accommodates the requirements
for procedures and decisions in regular civil litigation. These
requirements generally align with the equality standard. The third set
consists of requirements for procedures and decisions in actions for

108. See STEIN, supra note 8, at 219-25 ("The equality principle demands that risk of error be
allocated equally between the claimant and the defendant ... [as the] losses that the claimant
and the defendant might undeservedly suffer are equally regrettable.").
109. Id.
110. See Grogan v. Gartner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991) ("[T]he preponderance-of-the-evidence
standard results in a roughly equal allocation of the risk of error between litigants .
111. See supratext accompanying notes 84-96.
112. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423-24 (1979) (recognizing the need to interpose
heightened proof requirements to "protect particularly important individual interests in various
civil cases").
113. Id. at 431-33.
114. See, e.g., Johnson v. Solomon, 484 F. Supp. 278, 292 (D. Md. 1979) ("Today there can be
'little doubt that a person detained on grounds of mental illness has a right to counsel, and to
appointed counsel if the individual is indigent.'" (quoting Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078,
1097 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974))).
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denying fundamental rights. These requirements generally align with
the "heightened protection" standard. By applying these standards,
courts allocate decisional and participatory risks in a way that
minimizes the net harm from the erroneous disposition of cases.
C. The Unprotected Domain of Evidence
Constitutional regulation of the rules that determine evidential
adequacy has an altogether different format-a format best described
as a floating threat. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth and the
Fourteenth Amendments provides the framework for testing evidence
rules for constitutionality. The Clause accommodates the demand for
"due evidential standards," as the Amendments' history and
underlying rationale support this reading. 115 Early on, the Supreme
Court stated that the meaning of due process must be determined by a
"gradual process of inclusion or exclusion." 116 The Court interpreted
the scope of due process broadly. Specifically, it held that this scope is
"dictated by a study and appreciation of the meaning, the essential
implications, of liberty itself."1 1 7 According to this understanding, the
Due Process Clause guaranteed "not particular forms of procedure,
but the very substance of individual rights to life, liberty and
property."1 18 The standard for examining the constitutionality of an
evidential or procedural rule under this Clause was whether the rule
violated "the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty"1 1 9 or
"offend[ed] some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental."'1 20
Originalists interpreted this standard as encompassing
"immemorial usage,"1 2 1 that is,

115. See generally AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 385-91 (2005);
RODNEY L. MOTT, DUE PROCESS OF LAW: A HISTORICAL AND ANALYTICAL TREATISE OF THE
PRINCIPLES AND METHODS FOLLOWED BY THE COURTS IN THE APPLICATION OF THE CONCEPT OF

THE "LAW OF THE LAND" 241-55 (1926); Sanford H. Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due
ProcessAdjudication-A Survey and Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319 (1957).
116. Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 104 (1877).
117. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326 (1937).
118. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 532 (1884).
119. Palko, 302 U.S. at 325.
120. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934); see also Brown v. Mississippi, 297
U.S. 278, 285 (1936) (confirming the Snyder formulation).
121. As explained in one of the Supreme Court's foundational decisions, Hurtado, 110 U.S. at
521:
[T]he phrase "due process of law" is equivalent to "law of the land," as found in the
twenty-ninth chapter of Magna Charta; ...that it refers to and includes, not only the
general principles of public liberty and private right, which lie at the foundation of all
free government, but the very institutions which, venerable by time and custom, have
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those settled usages and modes of proceeding existing in the common and statute law of
England, before the emigration of our ancestors, and which are shown not to have been
condition by having been acted on by them after the
unsuited to their civil and 1political
22
settlement of this country.

The originalist approach, of course, required courts to adapt the old
rules to the new social conditions. Consequently, courts often
transformed those rules into general standards not anticipated by the
123
Constitution's framers.
Contemporary constitutional jurisprudence reaffirms this
understanding of due process. In Mooney v. Holohan, the Supreme
Court held that a prosecutor's contrivance to procure the defendant's
conviction by perjured testimony violated due process. 124 To sustain
the conviction, the government relied on the trial process that allowed
the defendant to exercise his participatory power.1 25 The defendant
was able to cross-examine prosecution witnesses and to adduce
exculpatory evidence. 126 No inhibitions were imposed on his
been tried by experience and found fit and necessary for the preservation of those
principles, and which, having been the birthright and inheritance of every English
subject, crossed the Atlantic with the colonists and were transplanted and established
in the fundamental laws of the state; that, having been originally introduced into the
constitution of the United States as a limitation upon the powers of the government,
brought into being by that instrument, it has now been added as an additional
security to the individual against oppression by the states themselves ....
Jones v. Robbins, 74 Mass. (8 Gray) 329, 342-43 (1857) (Shaw, C.J.) (interpreting "the law of the
land" and "process of law" standards as referring to England's Magna Carta); Bank of Columbia
v. Okely, 17 U.S. 235, 244 (1819) (interpreting "due process" as referring to the principles of
Magna Carta, "private rights," and "distributive justice"); see alsoTwining v. New Jersey, 211
U.S. 78, 100-02, 105-06 (1908) (confirming all of the above).
122. Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 277 (1855); see also
Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 43 (1996) (explaining that "historical practice" is the primary
guide as to whether a principle is "fundamental" under the Due Process Clause).
123. Consider, for example, Justice Scalia's interpretive modernization of the old
confrontation right, articulated in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). His holding that
the right entitles the defendant to cross-examine providers of inculpating testimonial evidence is
not an application that the Constitution's framers originally envisioned. Today's "testimonial
evidence" is a concept that captures many previously unknown forms of testimony. Justice
Scalia's interpretation, however, is still faithful to the broad principle underlying the Sixth
Amendment's text. See Jeffrey L. Fisher, CategoricalRequirements in Constitutional Criminal
Procedure, 94 GEO. L.J. 1493, 1518 (2006) (explaining Crawford's"originalism" as a blend of new
trial practices and the framers' understandings that resulted in a "contemporary judgment
concerning how a common law right can best be implemented in the modern criminal justice
system"); see also Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT.
(forthcoming 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=925558 (advancing the idea that
constitutional interpretation requires fidelity to the principles underlying the Constitution's text,
but not to the text's original expected application).
124. 294 U.S. 103 (1935) (per curiam) (finding conviction sought through deliberate use of
perjured testimony to be "as inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of justice as is the
obtaining of a like result by intimidation").
125. Id. at 111-12.
126. Id. at 112.
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participation in the court proceedings. The defendant also made no
complaints about the rule of decision: in all likelihood, he was
convicted under the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard. 27 The
government claimed, therefore, that the defendant failed to raise
before the Court an issue of federal constitutional concern. 128 The
Court rejected this claim, describing it as a "narrow view of the
requirement of due process." 129 The Court ruled that perjured
testimony violates due process when the prosecution knowingly uses it
to secure the defendant's conviction. 130 This ruling suggests that the
prosecution might also violate due process when it knows that its
13
evidence might be false. '
The impact of this decision on what evidence is constitutionally
permissible at trial is significant. Mooney breaks the proceduredecision dichotomy and interprets due process broadly enough to
encompass the constitutional review of evidential adequacy. The
Supreme Court has confirmed this understanding of Mooney on a
number of occasions. 32 Today's constitutional doctrine holds that bad
evidence may invalidate the defendant's conviction on due process
grounds. 133 This is the case when, during a suggestive lineup
127. Id. at 110-11.
128. Id. at 111-12.
129. Id. at 112. Because the defendant had not exhausted his recourse to courts below, his
habeas corpus petition was denied without prejudice. Id. at 115.
130. Id. at 112-13; see also Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269, 272 (1959) (holding that the
prosecution's failure to correct testimony known to be false violates due process); Pyle v. Kansas,
317 U.S. 213, 215-16 (1942) (same).
131. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976) (stating that "fundamental
unfairness" could attach to cases in which the prosecution should have known about the perjury,
but underscoring that, under the prevalent understanding of Mooney, a merely constructive
awareness is not enough).
132. See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 298-99 (1994) (Stevens J., dissenting) (noting that
Mooney rejected as unduly "formalistic" the interpretation of Due Process as requiring proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, probable cause, and process rights); Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416
U.S. 637, 646-48 (1974) (reaffirming Mooney); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-54
(1972) (same); Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1, 7 (1967) (same); Napue, 360 U.S. at 269 (same); Alcorta
v.Texas, 355 U.S. 28, 31 (1957) (same); Pyle, 317 U.S. at 215-16 (same).
133. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174 (1949) ("Guilt in a criminal case must
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt and by evidence confined to that which long experience in
the common-law tradition, to some extent embodied in the Constitution, has crystallized into
rules of evidence consistent with that standard. These rules are historically grounded rights of
our system, developed to safeguard men from dubious and unjust convictions, with resulting
forfeitures of life, liberty and property."); see also Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 96-97 & n.4
(1970) (Harlan J., concurring) ('The task [of examining the constitutionality of evidence rules] is
far more appropriately performed under the aegis of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments'
commands that federal and state trials, respectively, must be conducted in accordance with due
process of law. It is by this standard that I would test federal and state rules of evidence. ...
Reliance on the Due Process Clauses would also have the virtue of subjecting rules of evidence to
constitutional scrutiny in civil and criminal trials alike.").
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proceeding, the police implicitly point to the accused and tell the
identifying witness: "this is the man." Any such proceeding is
fundamentally unfair; consequently, it violates due process. 134 As the
Court underscored in Dowling v. United States, any evidence should
be ruled inadmissible when its admission "violates 'fundamental
conceptions of justice.' ,13
The Court, however, limited this notion to a very narrow
category of infractions. 136 Thus far, it has included in this category
only two cases: government-induced perjury 37 and identification
testimony from a suggestive lineup.1 38 Admission of such evidence, in
139
the Court's view, is fundamentally unfair and violates due process.
Another "fundamentally unfair" scenario recognized by the Ninth
Circuit would prohibit prosecutorial use of evidence from which
140
factfinders can draw no rational inferences against the defendant.
The Court has the power to expand the "fundamental unfairness"
category, but for now, this line of precedent remains dormant. The
Court also has committed itself to exercise this power in highly
exceptional circumstances 14 1-again, without specifying what these
circumstances might be. 142 The emerging doctrine therefore poses a

134. See, e.g., Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 105-06 (1977) (using the "substantial
likelihood of misidentification" criterion for suppressing suggestive identification procedures on
due process grounds); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 196-99 (1972) (same); Foster v. California,
394 U.S. 440, 442-43 (1969) (holding that an unnecessarily suggestive lineup violates due process
if admitted into evidence); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301-02 (1967) (same).
135. 493 U.S. 342, 352 (1990) (quoting United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 790 (1977)).
136. Id.
137. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 110, 112-13 (1935).
138. Foster, 394 U.S. at 442-43.
139. Id.
140. See Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 920 (9th Cir. 1991) (calling proof of drugdealing by evidence that defendant drove a car with $135,000 in the trunk "a problem," but
holding that this problem did not make defendant's trial fundamentally unfair because "there is
a rational inference the jury could draw from the challenged evidence," while fundamental
unfairness can only occur "if there are no permissible inferences the jury may draw from the
evidence").
141. See Dowling, 493 U.S. at 352 (holding that an evidence rule should only be voided if it
violates our "fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political
institutions"); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 563-64 (1967) (upholding the constitutionality of
Texas law rendering prior-crime evidence admissible to prove recidivism in a single criminal
proceeding, after establishing that the law is not fundamentally unfair, and explaining that the
"fundamental unfairness" doctrine does not allow the Supreme Court to tell states how to define
their evidence rules).
142. In Dowling, 493 U.S. at 352-53, the Supreme Court held that admission of criminal
disposition evidence was not "fundamentally unfair" because trial judges' limiting instruction
adequately guarded against prejudice. On analogous grounds, the Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth
Circuits upheld the constitutionality of Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 414, under which a
defendant's prior sexual misconduct is admissible to prove the crime at issue in the instant trial.
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floating constitutional threat for courts and lawmakers, both state and
federal.
This floating constitutional control over the domain of evidence
contrasts starkly with the elaborated set of constitutional rules that
the Supreme Court has imposed on procedures and decisions. Why is
the Court's application of constitutional standards to evidence rules so
exceptional, when the constitutional control over procedures and
decisions is so pervasive?
Constitutional doctrine that extends to procedure and decisions
unmistakably identifies the Supreme Court's agenda in civil and
criminal adjudication. The Court has exercised its constitutional
power in both areas to entrench its preferred conceptions of justice
and fairness in risk-allocation. The Court's agenda, however, can be
subverted by lawmakers and judges acting in the constitutionally
unprotected domain of evidence. Lawmakers and judges disagreeing
with the Court's agenda may produce evidential rules and rulings that
effect a different allocation of the risk of error. Because evidence rules
escape constitutional scrutiny, such dissenters have enough room to
maneuver.
Consider criminal adjudication. There, the Supreme Court's
agenda is to protect defendants against erroneous conviction. The
"equal best" standard (or its conceptual equivalent) determines the
level of required protection. Now consider a lawmaker willing to
subvert this standard. To this end, the lawmaker could abolish the
corroboration requirement for confessions 143 and for accomplice

See United States v. LeMay, 260 F.3d 1018, 1031 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that Rule 414 does not
violate Due Process, Equal Protection, or the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual
punishment); United States v. Mound, 149 F.3d 799, 801 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that Rule 413
does not violate Due Process and that neither Rule 413 nor 414 violates Equal Protection
because trial judges' discretion under FED. R. EVID. 403 to exclude excessively prejudicial
evidence adequately protects defendants against prejudice); United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d
1427, 1433 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding on similar grounds that Rule 413 does not violate Due
Process); see also Aviva Orenstein, Deviance, Due Process, and the False Promise of FederalRule
of Evidence 403, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1487, 1517 (2005) (supporting the proposition that Federal
Rules of Evidence 413 and 414 and their state equivalents violate due process, but observing that
"it would be foolish for those who are concerned about the reach of these rules.., to count on a
successful due process challenge").
143. Cf. State v. Polly, 657 N.W.2d 462, 466 (Iowa 2003) (holding that "a confession standing
alone will not warrant a criminal conviction unless other proof shows the defendant committed
the crime"); Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 89 (1954) (noting that confession made by the
accused needs corroborating evidence to serve as the basis for a conviction); N.Y. CRIM. PROC.
LAW § 60.50 (McKinney 2006) ("A person may not be convicted of any offense solely upon
evidence of a confession or admission made by him without additional proof that the offense
charged has been committed.").
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testimony, 144 permit the admission of evidence of defendants' prior
crimes, 145 and allow adjudicators to find the defendant guilty of a
crime based on a DNA statistic alone. 146 None of these hypothetical
rules unmakes the requirement that the prosecution prove the
defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Under these rules,
adjudicators still have to acquit the defendant in the face of a
reasonable doubt as to whether "he did it." Nor do any of these rules
erode the defendant's right to participate in her trial. The defendant is
able to cross-examine prosecution witnesses, challenge the credibility
of any evidence, call her own witnesses, and adduce other evidence
that may exonerate her. Therefore, the new rules do not increase the
decisional and participatory risks for criminal defendants. Their effect
is different, yet still detrimental, to innocent defendants. The rules
weaken the evidential base on which a person may be found guilty
"beyond a reasonable doubt" and, in doing so, increase the defendant's
informational risk.
These deviations from the "equal best" standard impact
evidence, as opposed to procedure and decision. They increase the
defendant's informational risk without increasing the participatory
and decisional risks. In the domain of evidence, however, the "equal
best" standard has no formal footing. The floating constitutional
threat is the only protection that the defendant can invoke, although it
does not help him. While the new rules are problematic, they do not
fall into the "fundamental unfairness" category. They hurt defendants
badly in several ways, but still do not allow the prosecution to obtain
convictions by relying on evidence known to be false. The defendant,
therefore, would not be able to demonstrate that these rules offend
"fundamental conceptions of justice." Of course, he may argue that the
rules subvert the Supreme Court's risk-allocating agenda, but this
argument can only demonstrate that the prevalent constitutional
doctrine is underinclusive. The new evidence rules pass constitutional
muster.
II. THE CASE FOR CONSTITUTIONALIZING EVIDENCE
This Part of the Article develops a theory calling for the
imposition of tight constitutional control on evidence rules. Because
144. Cf. 3 CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 38, at 239 & n.12 (15th ed. 1993

& Supp. 2007) (attesting that "it is now commonly required that the accomplice's testimony be
corroborated," and citing statutes and case law from two dozen states).
145. Cf. FED. R. EVID. 404(a) (providing that prior misconduct is generally inadmissible to
prove an action in conformity).
146. Compare with the opposite holdings in cases cited infra note 284.
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evidence rules apportion informational risks, they must align with the
constitutional doctrines allocating the risk of error in the procedural
and decisional domains. The apportionment of informational risks
must satisfy the same constitutional criteria that control the
allocation of decisional and participatory risks. The current
"fundamental unfairness" criterion is too narrow to secure this
alignment.
This theory also examines and criticizes the conventional
understanding of evidence rules as marginal and operationally
insignificant. This conventional understanding provides a partial
explanation of the "fundamental unfairness" criterion. Arguably, this
criterion is residual and exceptional because evidence rules are
residual and exceptional, too. These rules constitute exceptions to free
proof-a regime that allows judges and juries to determine facts by
exercising their ordinary reasoning skills without regulation from the
law. Again, the need to constrain adjudicators arguably arises only in
connection with procedures and decisions, as these may systematically
skew the risk of error in a constitutionally wrong direction. The
Supreme Court therefore imposes tight constitutional control on
procedures and decisions, while it is content to possess only an
exceptional and residual power to regulate evidentiary rules.
These arguments challenge my theory. Their conventional
wisdom status makes them eligible for a detailed discussion in Section
A below. There, I demonstrate that these arguments are
unsustainable. Evidence rules allocate the risk of error as much as
procedural and decisional rules do. Evidence rules, therefore, are
similarly infused with political morality and require the same
measure of constitutionalization. If people deserve constitutional
protection against risks of error that attach to procedures and
decisions, they ought to be protected against informational risks as
well. There is no principled argument by which to separate the
allocation of informational risks from the apportionment of decisional
and participatory risks.
My theory combines positive and normative arguments. I
postulate, rather than prove, that the Supreme Court's vision of how
to allocate the risk of error in civil and criminal cases is correct. Based
on this postulation, I examine the desirability of the constitutional
requirement that evidence rules align with that vision. My arguments
in favor of this alignment are normative, perhaps even exceedingly so.
For the time being, I ignore federalism and other forces operating
against the alignment. As Part III explains, these forces turn what
could be a formal constitutional law of evidence into an informal
practice.
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A. Marginalizationof Evidence Rules

The marginalization of evidence rules is both a widespread and
conspicuous phenomenon. This phenomenon hallmarks four distinct
areas of the law, each of which is a manifestation of the rules'
perceived marginality. Under this perception, a rule that controls
evidential admissibility or interposes a corroboration requirement has
only a minor significance for the legal system. Occasionally, such a
rule may determine the outcome of a particular trial, but it rarely
affects the workings of the system as a whole.
The first area is evidence law itself. Evidence rules, as
conventionally understood, are rare and unsystematic exceptions to
judges' and juries' free evaluation of evidence. 147 The second area is
the quasi-constitutional 148 doctrine of Erie,149 which categorizes
evidence rules as predominantly not outcome determinative. 150 This
characterization treats evidence rules as a trial technology that
generally does not determine the outcomes of diversity cases
adjudicated by federal courts. Based on this characterization, the Erie
doctrine designates federal rules to govern evidentiary matters, as
opposed to the state laws that actually decide the case. The third area
is the Ex Post Facto Clause.1 51 The Supreme Court interprets this
clause as extending solely to substantive matters-including rules of
decision, such as standards and burdens of proof-but not to rules
that regulate evidential adequacy.1 52 The fourth area is the Commerce
Clause. 1 53 This clause is construed by the Court as authorizing
147. See, e.g., MIRJAN R. DAMA KA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFr 149 (1997) (describing and
predicting dissipation of evidence rules); Eleanor Swift, One Hundred Years of Evidence Law
Reform: Thayer's Triumph, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2437 (2000) (describing, explaining, and criticizing
the marginalization of evidence rules); see also WILLIAM TWINING, RETHINKING EVIDENCE:
EXPLORATORY ESSAYS 211-12 (2d ed. 2006) ("In one of our classics of literature, Alice in
Wonderland, one of the characters is the Cheshire Cat who keeps appearing and disappearing
and fading away, so that sometimes one could see the whole body, sometimes only a head,
sometimes only a vague outline and sometimes nothing at all, so that Alice was never sure
whether or not he was there or, indeed, whether he existed at all. In practice, our rules of
evidence appear to be rather like that." (footnote omitted)).
148. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-ConstitutionalLaw: Clear
Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 605 (1992) (articulating
"quasi-constitutionalism" as explaining federal courts' diversity jurisdiction); Cass R. Sunstein,
Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 206 (2006) (categorizing the Erie doctrine as quasiconstitutional); see also John Hart Ely, The IrrepressibleMyth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 70006 (1974) (discussing the constitutional foundations of Erie).
149. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
150. See infra notes 174-182 and accompanying text.
151. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 ("No... ex post facto Law shall be passed.").
152. See Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513 (2000).
153. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (authorizing Congress to regulate interstate commerce).
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Congress to enact special evidence rules that advance substantive
federal goals in state courts154-recently exemplified by a rule that
protects the confidentiality of specified information 155-as opposed to
garden-variety rules that regulate the course of proof in state courts.
These understandings belittle the significance of evidence rules
by treating them as mere aids to factfinding. Further, the assumption
is that factfinding is a predominantly epistemic activity driven by the
factfinders'
common-sense reasoning, experience,
and logic.
Accordingly, evidence rules affect this activity only on the margins, by
introducing the proper adjudicative adjustments into the accepted
epistemic methodology. Evidence rules consequently affect court
decisions only in exceptional cases, typically by suppressing crucial
evidence on substantive policy grounds. 156 When evidence rules have
this exceptional effect, however, the law categorizes them as
substantive rather than evidential. 15 7 Burdens and standards of proof
also fall into the substantive category, as they go directly into the
adjudicators' final decision.1 58 Most evidence rules do not have these
effects and thus are categorized as marginal or even technical. My
present goal is to show that these understandings are incorrect.

154. See Pierce County v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129, 146-47 (2003) (upholding constitutionality of
federal statute, 23 U.S.C. § 409, making privileged, and protecting from disclosure and
admission into evidence in state courts, any "reports, surveys, schedules, lists, or data compiled
or collected for the purpose of identifying, evaluating, or planning the safety enhancement of
potential accident sites ... [pursuant to the above statute] or for the purpose of developing any
highway safety construction improvement project which may be implemented utilizing
Federal-aid highway funds"); see also Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138-42 (1988) (holding that
state courts entertaining a federal cause of action ought to adjust their procedures so that the
underlying federal goal is achieved and the federal right is protected); Brown v. Western Ry. Co.
of Ala., 338 U.S. 294, 296 (1949) (holding in relation to state procedures that a "federal right
cannot be defeated by the forms of local practice").
155. See Guillen, 537 U.S. at 146-47.
156. As in Guillen, this is what evidentiary privileges typically do. See 1 MCCORMICK, supra
note 16, § 72 (explaining that while rules of privilege inhibit the factfinding process, they are
warranted because they "protect the interests and relationships which ... are regarded as of
sufficient social importance to justify some sacrifice of availability of evidence").
157. See Ely, supra note 148, at 724-27 (attesting that privileges are substantive rules);
Timothy P. Glynn, Federalizing Privilege, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 59, 133 (2002) (same); Jack B.
Weinstein, The Uniformity-Conformity Dilemma FacingDraftsmen of Federal Rules of Evidence,
69 COLUM. L. REV. 353, 373 (1969) (same).
158. See Raleigh v. Ill. Dept. of Revenue, 530 U.S. 15, 20-21 (2000) ("Given its importance to
the outcome of cases, we have long held the burden of proof to be a "substantive" aspect of a
claim." (citing Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 271
(1994); Dick v. New York Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 437, 446 (1959); Garrett v. Moore-McCormack
Co., 317 U.S. 239, 249 (1942))). For a general theoretical account of proof burdens' substantive
nature, see Ronald J. Allen, Structuring Jury Decisionmaking in Criminal Cases: A Unified
ConstitutionalApproach to Evidentiary Devices, 94 HARV. L. REV. 321 (1980).
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1. Marginalization of Evidence Rules by the Law of Evidence
Evidence law has a structure of rules, on the one hand, and
unregulated factfinding or "free proof," on the other. Under the
conventional view, free proof is prevalent, while evidence rules are
marginal exceptions. 159 Adjudicative factfinding, therefore, is
perceived as a predominantly epistemic endeavor. 60 Factfinders
determine facts by common sense, logic, and experience. Their
decisions are affected by a few evidentiary rules that facilitate
factfinding and by even more exceptional rules that promote goals
unrelated to factfinding. Factfinders exercise their judgment under
the controlling burdens of proof. Because law has "no mandamus to
the logical faculty"' 61-and presumably to the epistemological faculty
as well-it cannot control this endeavor. As such, the conventional
view further marginalizes evidence rules by consolidating their
exceptions. According to this view, these exceptions reinstate free
proof.
This coordinated silencing of the legal establishes the
dominance of the epistemological. Evidence rules aligned with the
prevalent epistemology do not disturb its proclaimed dominance in
factfinding, while evidence rules that remain unaligned are
categorized as outliers. The conventional understanding of evidence
rules is thus founded on assimilation and exile.
This understanding is flawed. 62 Any rule of evidence that
shapes the content of factfinders' evidential base allocates
informational risks. When factfinders are free to use any evidence,
they are also free to apportion informational risks as they deem
appropriate. Consider the following hypothetical case: 163 A corrections
facility accommodating 1,000 inmates experiences a riot conducted by
999 inmates who kill a number of corrections officers. One inmate
159. See sources cited supra note 147.
160. For recent statements of this view, see Michael S. Pardo, The Field of Evidence and the
Field of Knowledge, 24 LAW & PHIL. 321, 321 (2005) (calling the trial a "fundamentally
epistemological event"); Mike Redmayne, The Structure of Evidence Law, 26 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 805, 805-07 (2006) (reviewing STEIN, supra note 8) (describing adjudicative factfinding as
determination of probabilities on factual grounds).
161. JAMES B. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 314 n. 1

(1898).
162. See STEIN, supra note 8, at 64-140 (demonstrating that allocation of the risk of error by
evidence rules is pervasive); see also Ronald J. Allen, Laudan, Stein, and the Limits of Theorizing
About JuridicalProof, 27 LAW & PHIL. (forthcoming 2008) (on file with Vanderbilt Law Review)
(critiquing the present author's evidence theory and its "top-down" methodology while accepting
its key point about the pervasiveness of risk-allocation).
163. This example is adapted from Charles R. Nesson, Reasonable Doubt and Permissive
Inferences: The Value of Complexity, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1187, 1192-93 (1979).
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stood against the wall and did not participate in the riot. This inmate
is unidentifiable, and so every inmate accused of participating in the
riot will claim to be him. Subsequently, each of the 1,000 inmates is
accused of murdering the officers.
The probability of guilt in each criminal case equals 0.999,
which surpasses the conviction threshold set by the "beyond a
reasonable doubt" rule. 164 Factfinders, however, have no evidence on
which to distinguish between the inmates who participated in the riot
and the inmate who did not. This lacuna creates an informational risk,
altogether separate from the decisional risk allocated by the
probability rule. The two risks are different because one relates to the
rule setting the probability on which factfinders must find the
defendant guilty, while the other attaches to the information on which
factfinders determine this probability. The former risk is decisional,
while the latter is informational.
The quality of the evidence that factfinders use in their
decisionmaking determines the informational risk imposed on the
losing party. 16 5 Because factfinders never have complete information,
informational risks are present in every case. Burdens of proof-rules
of decision that employ
quantitative
probabilistic
criteria
("preponderance," "beyond a reasonable doubt," and "clear and
convincing")-cannot control those risks. These quantitative criteria
cannot account for the informational risk-a risk of erroneous decision
originating from the incompleteness and limited dependability of the
information on which the probability of the case is calculated. An
informational risk accompanying the factfinder's probability
assessment determines the assessment's epistemic quality. The risk's
extent indicates the strength of the probability assessment, which,
166
once again, depends on the deficiencies of the evidence.
This qualitative criterion has no quantitative effect on the
probability assessment. 6 7 Because informational risks are ubiquitous,
if any such risk could unmake the factfinders' determination of a
preponderance or beyond a reasonable doubt, factfinding would
become impossible. Moreover, the presence of an informational risk is
not a good reason for decreasing the probability that factfinders
otherwise could find on the existing evidence. Missing evidence could

164. See, e.g., Alexander Volokh, n Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 173, 173 (1997) (examining
probability requirements for convictions under which a 0.999 probability of guilt is sufficient).
165. See STEIN, supra note 8, at 40-49, 80-91 (demonstrating how the quality of the evidence
that factfinders use affects allocation of the risk of error).
166. Id. at 80-91 (conceptualizing informational risk as probabilities' "weight").
167. Id.
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increase that probability as well, and there is no way to know it.168
This, indeed, is the essence of the uncertainty problem.
The allocation of informational risks affects court decisions
that define people's liberties and properties. This allocation, therefore,
needs to have a moral and political warrant. However, the
conventional view suppresses this moral and political aspect of
adjudicative factfinding based on a theory that denies the existence of
informational risks. According to this artificial theory, factfinders
properly can account for any evidential deficiency in applying the
burdens of proof.169 By branding factfinding an epistemic endeavor,
this theory produces two effects. Evidence rules that respond to the
chosen epistemological criteria appear "normal," while other evidence
rules are classified as "extraneous" to factfinding. Moreover, these
"extraneous" rules appear exceptional because most evidence rules can
be rationalized in epistemological terms.
As I have explained, these appearances are false.
Understanding that adjudicative factfinding is pervasively moral and
political has a profound normative consequence. This understanding
calls for a re-rationalization of evidence rules. Rules that control
evidential adequacy allocate the risk of error. 170 They have this effect
when they classify evidence as admissible, when they keep evidence
from factfinders by categorizing it as inadmissible, and when they
prescribe which evidence requires corroboration.171 Free proof is an
evidence rule, too: one that allows factfinders to apportion the risk of
error as they deem fit.172 Failure to acknowledge it will not make the
risk of error disappear.
73
Allocation of the risk of error by evidence rules is pervasive.
And this pervasiveness calls for the installation of tight constitutional
control over evidence rules. Constitutional doctrine guards against

168. For such cases, probability theory offers the "indifference principle"-a technical
assumption that the information unavailable to factfinders is not slanted in either direction. See
L. JONATHAN COHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF INDUCTION AND PROBABILITY 4347 (1989); JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, A TREATISE ON PROBABILITY 41-64 (1921). This principle

relies on the mutually offsetting effect of unknown possibilities that unfold in a long sequence of
identical trials. For a single case, in which the event in question either occurred or did not, this
randomizing strategy is inappropriate. See STEIN, supra note 8, at 40-49.
169. For a recent, but still unsustainable, layout of this theory, see Redmayne, supra note
160, at 807-15.
170. See STEIN, supra note 8, at 107-40 (arguing that "[l]egal regulation of adjudicative factfinding needs to be tightened" in order to control the apportionment of the risk of error).
171. Id. at 118-22.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 133-40; see also Allen, supra note 162 (manuscript at 44) (accepting the view that
"rules of evidence do not just do what they purport to do; they also allocate error, like it or not").
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impositions of the risk of error by adjudicative procedures and
decisions. To achieve its goals, it also should guard against similar
impositions of risk by the rules of evidence.
2. Marginalization of Evidence Rules Under Erie
Under the Erie doctrine, 74 federal courts adjudicating diversity
disputes must apply the state law that controls the case. 175 The
controlling status attaches both to substantive laws and to any
procedural arrangement with a substantive 76 or "significant" effect on
178
the litigation's outcome. 177 This outcome-determinative category
includes all decisional rules that fix the standards and allocate the
burdens of proof.179 Evidentiary privileges that suppress probative
evidence on confidentiality and privacy grounds fall into the same
substantive category. 8 0 All other evidentiary rules-specifically those
that govern the admissibility of evidence-are expelled from the
outcome-determinative category. 8 1 This expulsion is based on the
174. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
175. Ascertainment of that law relies on the choice-of-law principles. See FRIEDENTHAL ET
AL., supra note 13, § 4.5.
176. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) (rejecting the substantiveprocedural divide as a criterion for identifying the applicable law under Erie).
177. Id. As explained by FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 13, § 4.3, at 212, Guaranty Trust
Co. viewed Erie as "an attempt to achieve vertical uniformity, that is, the consistent application
of local substantive law in both state and federal courts within the same state," as well as to
"eliminate a major incentive for litigants of diverse citizenship to forum shop."
178. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965) (applying the "outcome-determination"
test, but not "without reference to the twin aims of the Erie rule: discouragement of forumshopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws"); see also Gasperini v. Ctr. for
Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427-28 (1996) (stating and applying the "outcome-determination"
test in relation to the "twin aims" of Erie articulated in Hanna); Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501
U.S. 32, 52 (1991) (same).
179. This rule is well-settled. See Dick v. New York Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 437, 446-47 (1959)
(holding that, under Erie, state law controls the allocation of the burden of proof); Palmer v.
Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 116-17 (1943) (same); Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U.S. 208, 212
(1939) (same); Monger v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 812 F.2d 402, 404-05 (8th Cir. 1987) (same); see
also FED. R. EVID. 302 (providing that state law controls presumptions whenever it supplies a
rule of decision for the case).
180. See FED. R. EVID. 501 (providing that state law controls all privileges whenever it
supplies the rule of decision for the case); see also GRAHAM C. LILLY, PRINCIPLES OF EVIDENCE §
10.2, at 324-25 (4th ed. 2006) (explaining that, in diversity cases, evidentiary privileges track the
substantive law of the state).
181. See Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 470-72 (7th Cir. 1984) (classifying FED.
R. EVID. 407, which excludes evidence of subsequent remedial measures, as procedural, and
consequently applicable in diversity cases, despite having "substantive consequences by virtue of
affecting incentives to take safety measures after an accident occurs"); In re Air Crash Disaster
near Chicago, 701 F.2d 1189, 1193 (7th Cir. 1982) ("[T]he Federal Rules of Evidence govern the
admissibility of evidence in diversity cases."); Rabon v. Automatic Fasteners, Inc., 672 F.2d 1231,
1238 n.14 (5th Cir. 1982) ("[Flederal law governs procedural matters ... including the
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theory that the rules' effect on the outcome of the case is not
18 2
significant enough.
This doctrine marginalizes evidence rules that allocate
informational, as opposed to decisional, risks. However, as
demonstrated above, informational and decisional risks have similar
effects. There are many good reasons-including predictability,
uniformity, and economy of scale-for applying federal admissibility
rules in diversity cases. An unprincipled differentiation between
informational and decisional risks, however, is not among those
183
reasons.
3. Marginalization of Evidence Rules Under the Ex Post Facto Clause
The Supreme Court interprets the Ex Post Facto Clause 1 4- the constitutional prohibition of retroactive legislation-as extending
solely to substantive rules and to the rules of decision formulated as
burdens of proof.18 5 In Carmell v. Texas, the Court applied this
interpretation to an evidence rule.18 6 The Court held that a
corroboration requirement for a prosecution witness-a rape
complainant' 8 7-- is part and parcel of the prosecution's burden of
admissibility of evidence." (internal citations omitted)); cf. Morton v. Brockman, 184 F.R.D. 211,
215 (D. Me. 1999) (holding that a Maine statute suppressing evidence of nonuse of seatbelts in
product liability actions against car manufacturers derives from a substantive policy and
consequently trumps federal evidence rules).
182. See, e.g., Ronan E. Degnan, The Law of FederalEvidence Reform, 76 HARv. L. REV. 275,
293-95 (1962) (categorizing hearsay, opinion, and other admissibility rules as not outcome
determinative, and as consequently belonging to the domain of federal law, under Erie); Mason
Ladd, Uniform Evidence Rules in the Federal Courts, 49 VA. L. REV. 692, 709 (1963) (identifying
exceptions to the hearsay rule as not outcome determinative because there is "no assurance that
the trier of fact ... will believe the evidence" admitted under those exceptions).
183. Cf. Swift, supra note 147, at 2471-76 (arguing that many admissibility rules are
outcome determinative).
184. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
185. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 391 (1798) ("[I] do not consider any law ex post facto,
within the prohibition, that mollifies the rigor of the criminal law; but only those that create, or
aggravate, the crime; or encrease [sic] the punishment, or change the rules of evidence, for the
purpose of conviction."); see also Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 530 (2000) (citing Calder v. Bull
to support the proposition that the Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits retroactive changes of
evidential sufficiency requirements).
186. 529 U.S. at 530.
187. The Supreme Court examined the constitutionality of a Texas statute modifying a
corroboration arrangement for cases of rape and sexual assault. Under the old arrangement, a
defendant could not be convicted on his complainant's testimony if it were not corroborated by
the complainant's prompt outcry or by evidence extraneous to her testimony. The old statute
exempted from this arrangement complainants below fourteen years of age. The new statute,
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.07 (Vernon 2000), as it was then, raised the exempted
complainants' age to under eighteen. The statute effectively provided that, from then on, a jury
could convict the defendant on the uncorroborated testimony of a fourteen- to seventeen-year-old
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proving the defendant's guilt beyond all reasonable doubt.1 88
Consequently, this requirement cannot be removed from prosecutions
18 9
for crimes allegedly committed prior to its abolition or alteration.
In justifying this conclusion, the Court distinguished between
the unprotected and the protected categories of evidence rules. The Ex
Post Facto Clause does not extend to the unprotected category of rules:
rules that determine what evidence is admissible. By contrast, the
protected category consists of rules that fix the level of proof that
incriminating evidence must reach in order to allow adjudicators to
convict the defendant. The Court held that modifying these rules
retroactively violates the clause. 190
The dissenting Justices accepted this distinction, but reached
the opposite conclusion. 191 According to them, the corroboration
requirement sets a formal credibility condition for basing a
defendant's conviction on the testimony of a single witness.1 9 2 This
requirement is identical to conditional admissibility. The dissent thus
found that the corroboration requirement is not part of the criminal
burden of proof constitutionally protected by the Ex Post Facto
Clause.193
The dissent and the Court's opinion are both flawed. A rule
that allows the prosecution to use evidence that previously was
deemed inadequate-say, uncorroborated testimony of a rape
complainant194-in order to satisfy a demanding proof standard for
convictions is functionally equivalent to a rule that lessens the
standard of proof to achieve the same effect. The first measure
reallocates the informational risk, while the second reallocates the
decisional risk. Both measures, however, achieve the same
substantive result.
complainant if it found the testimony credible beyond all reasonable doubt. Carmell, 529 U.S. at
518-19.
188. Carmell, 529 U.S. at 530 ("Under the law in effect at the time the acts were committed,
the prosecution's case was legally insufficient and petitioner was entitled to a judgment of
acquittal, unless the State could produce both the victim's testimony and corroborative
evidence.").
189. Id. at 539-47.
190. Id.

191. Id. at 553 (Ginsburg J., dissenting).
192. Id.
193. Id. at 560-61 ("Under both the old and new versions of the statute, the applicable
standard is proof beyond a reasonable doubt.").
194. I do not discuss here the merits of this rule. See generally Michelle J. Anderson, The
Legacy of the Prompt Complaint Requirement, Corroboration Requirement, and Cautionary
Instructions on Campus Sexual Assault, 84 B.U. L. REv. 945, 977-86 (2004) (explaining
persuasively the corroboration requirement for rape accusations as driven by societal bias
against complainants).
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The Court and the dissent track one of the fundamentals of
Erie: the distinction between evidentiary rules that are and are not
outcome determinative. 195 While a rule of evidence classified as
outcome determinative under Erie is substantive enough to be
protected by the Ex Post Facto Clause, an evidentiary rule outside this
category is not, and therefore is eligible for retroactive removal or
modification. The Court classified the corroboration requirement as
outcome determinative because it defined it as an addition to the
prosecution's burden of proof. The dissenting Justices, however,
classified it as not outcome determinative because it operates
similarly to a garden-variety rule that controls the adequacy of
evidence. For reasons already given, evidential adequacy rules have
the same outcome-determinative effect as burdens and standards of
proof.196 Yet based on both the Court's and the dissent's perspective,
the outcome-determinative category includes only those rules of
evidence that allocate decisional risks. This perspective marginalizes
informational risk and all evidentiary rules that allocate it.
4. Marginalization of Evidence Rules Under the Commerce Clause
The Constitution's fundamental premise holds that, subject to
due process and a few other safeguards, 197 states are free to design
evidence rules for their own courts.19 8 Federal actions adjudicated in
state courts are the only area in which exceptions to this general
principle are allowed.1 99 But what happens in the case of federal
interests, as opposed to actions?

195. See supra notes 178 and accompanying text.
196. Classifying evidentiary rules, along with the standards and burdens of proof, as
outcome determinative is still a far cry from protecting them against retroactive changes.
Evidential entitlements attach to a person only at a trial in which they can be activated. Before
that time, a person holds no evidential entitlements whatsoever. At his trial, moreover, he
captures only those evidential entitlements that exist at that time. Changes in the law of
evidence that preceded a person's trial therefore ought not to be invalidated on retroactivity
grounds. They simply are not retroactive to begin with. For full explanation of this point, see
STEIN, supranote 8, at 17-25.
197. These are enumerated above in Part I.
198. See Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138 (1988) ("No one disputes the general and
unassailable proposition.., that States may establish the rules of procedure governing litigation
in their own courts."); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201 (1977) (stating the principle that
"it is normally 'within the power of the State to regulate procedures under which its laws are
carried out, including the burden of producing evidence and the burden of persuasion.'" (quoting
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 523 (1958))); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 563-64 (1967)
(stating that the Supreme Court has no constitutional warrant to dictate evidence rules to
states).
199. See supra note 154.
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Although application of an evidence rule in a state proceeding
is an intrastate activity, it may also affect interstate commerce. For
example, a state may adopt an evidentiary rule that effectively eases
the proof of a product defect in a car by shifting the risk of error as to
whether the car was defective to its manufacturer. Yet by doing so,
this rule may increase car prices across the United States.
Accordingly, Congress might exercise its authority under the
Commerce Clause 200 to interpose a uniform proof requirement that it
considers well balanced. As another example, consider a rule,
pertinent to a state tort action, which allows the disclosure and
admission into evidence of any official report documenting the
accident history of a particular state road. 20 1 This rule may discourage
the preparation of official accident reports, as states face liability for
accidents that occur at hazardous locations. 20 2 But because safe state
roads are instrumental to interstate commerce, 20 3 Congress may be
willing to encourage the compilation of road-improving data by
creating a special evidentiary privilege for official accident reports.
The evidentiary privilege under 23 U.S.C. § 409 does exactly
2
0
4
that. In Guillen, the Supreme Court extended this privilege to road
safety reports and data collections conducted in furtherance of federal
programs aimed at enhancing safety on state roadways. 20 5 The Court
acknowledged that the privilege assisted "state and local governments
in reducing hazardous conditions in the Nation's channels of
commerce." 20 6 To avoid excessive incursion into state court
procedures 20 7 and inhibiting the ascertainment of the truth in tort
actions, 20 the Court confined the privilege to this narrow federal

200. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
201. See, e.g., Getchell v. Lodge, 65 P.3d 50, 55-58 (Alaska 2003) (holding that police officers'
accident reports are generally admissible under Alaska evidence rules).
202. See Pierce County v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129, 133-34 (2003) (taking notice of the report to
Congress by the Secretary of Transportation, according to which "the States feared that diligent
efforts to identify [hazardous] roads ... would increase the risk of liability for accidents that took
place at hazardous locations before improvements could be made").
203. See id. at 147 (finding that legislation that would result in "greater safety on our
Nation's roads" could be interpreted as "[aiming] at improving safety in the channels of
commerce and increasing protection for the instrumentalities of interstate commerce," and
therefore "[falling] within Congress' Commerce Clause power").
204. 23 U.S.C. § 409 (2000) (amended 2004).
205. Guillen, 537 U.S. at 146-48.
206. Id. at 147.
207. Id. at 146-47.
208. Id. at 144-45.
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objective. 20 9 This confinement shields the Court from a federalist
210
accusation of writing evidence rules for state courts.
Guillen represents further, albeit incorrect, support of the
spurious notion of "substantive effect" that separates different
evidentiary rules. Guillen's interpretation of the Commerce Clause
singles out state rules of evidence that run expressly against federal
interests in interstate commerce. Under Guillen, it is only those rules
that Congress can override constitutionally; other state evidence rules
are outside the reach of Congress, presumably for lack of substantive
effect.
To understand the inaccuracy of this view, hypothesize that
after Guillen, Washington courts develop a rule instructing juries in
tort actions against the State to draw adverse inferences from the
State's failure to adduce all safety and accident reports pertaining to
the roadway in question. This rule would likely be categorized as
evidential rather than substantive. It is unlikely that the Guillen
doctrine would identify it as directly frustrating the federal interest in
the production of road safety reports. The new rule surely undercuts
that interest by creating a chilling effect almost identical to that of full
documentary disclosure. But it achieves this effect indirectly, by
shifting the risk of error in tort actions to the State. Should that make
a difference?
Maybe it should, as the Commerce Clause jurisprudence
inquires whether congressional enactment trespasses into an area
traditionally designated for state sovereignty as opposed to regulating
a traditional federal domain. 2 11 There is nothing wrong with the
Supreme Court supporting tradition. Adherence to tradition, however,
is not a good reason for maintaining fictional distinctions in the law
and passing them off as real. Evidence rules that allocate the risk of
error in state courts can affect federal interests regardless of whether
they are classified as federally significant. Whether Congress should
exercise control over such rules is a separate issue.

209. Id. at 146-48.

210. This accusation is still not without merit. See Lynn A. Baker, Lochner's Legacy for
Modern Federalism: Pierce County v. Guillen as a Case Study, 85 B.U. L. REv. 727, 734-35
(2005) ("Because the statute at issue regulated apparently non-commercial activity-the
discovery and introduction of evidence in civil litigation-and interfered with a traditional area
of state sovereignty-state judicial processes, one might reasonably have expected the States'
Rights Five [the late Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, Scalia, and
Thomas] to hold the statute unconstitutional .... " (footnotes omitted)).
211. As explained in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995). See also Baker, supra
note 210, at 762 (underscoring the pervasive role of tradition in the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Commerce Clause).
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B. ConstitutionalizingEvidence
The effect of evidentiary rules on the outcomes of both civil and
criminal trials is significant. Every trial, as well as every plea bargain
and settlement "in the shadow of the law," 212 is profoundly affected by
those rules and how they allocate the risk of error. Because the
allocation of informational risk is as constitutionally significant as the
apportionment of the risk of error by the constitutional rules of
procedure and decision, complete alignment of the three domains
appears to be a constitutional necessity. At a minimum, rules that
determine evidential adequacy for criminal cases must not increase
the defendant's informational risk above the level set by the rules that
the Supreme Court develops for federal trials. 2 13 In civil cases,
evidence rules should not increase the plaintiffs informational risk to
benefit the defendant, or vice versa. They may do so only in cases in
which a compelling-and constitutionally reviewable-governmental
interest calls for a different allocation of the risk.
The alternative to this constitutional alignment is for
lawmakers to develop any evidentiary rules that their politics might
require. Section I.C. has identified the implications of this lawmaking
power on criminal trials.214 As an example from civil litigation,
consider a hypothetical rule that reverses the burden of proof in
product liability actions. Specifically, this rule requires that out-ofstate manufacturers prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
their products are not defective "in any tort action filed by a resident
of the State." This discriminatory rule violates due process. However,
what about a rule prescribing that "any testimony of a product's
consumer stating her dissatisfaction with the product is admissible
against the manufacturer"? This rule eliminates the expert Witness
requirement for plaintiffs. But unlike the previous rule, it does not
reverse the burden of proof to the detriment of an out-of-state
defendant. Because the rule in question apportions an informational
risk, as opposed to the decisional risk allocated by the burden of proof,
it cannot be categorized as fundamentally unfair and, consequently,
does not violate due process. 2 15 But it does confer an unfair evidential

212. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargainingin the Shadow of the Law: The
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 950 (1979) (coining the "shadow of the law" metaphor).
213. See infra Part III.C.
214. See supra text accompanying notes 143-146.
215. The manufacturers' constitutional complaint would also face a threshold objection: the
"fundamental unfairness" criterion, as presently defined, applies in criminal cases alone. See
supra notes 121-142 and accompanying text.
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advantage upon plaintiffs, who happen to be residents of the state. 2 16
Constitutional alignment, therefore, seems to be necessary in this area
as well.
III. THE INFORMAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF EVIDENCE

Constitutional law pays little attention to informational risks.
The Supreme Court's decisions have installed tight constitutional
control over the apportionment of participatory and decisional risks
alone. These decisions implement the Court's moral vision of how to
allocate the risk of error in criminal and civil trials. The Court's
failure to impose this vision on the rules of evidence that allocate
informational risks-and that bring about the same consequences as
participatory and decisional risks-therefore gives the impression of a
constitutional oversight. What else could it be, given the
marginalization of evidentiary rules that transpires from the Erie
doctrine, from the Court's interpretation of the Ex Post Facto and
Commerce clauses, and, indeed, from evidence law itself?
This Part of the Article demonstrates that the "constitutional
oversight" hypothesis is too simplistic. As an initial observation, it is
simply hard to believe that Supreme Court Justices do not see the
relationship between evidence rules and the risk of error. More
crucially, the oversight hypothesis ignores a number of factors that
explain the absence of formal constitutionalization in the area of
evidence. First, the Supreme Court maintains a floating constitutional
threat to void any rule of evidence that brings about fundamental
unfairness. The Court pledged to carry out this threat only in extreme
cases, but has made no interpretive commitments as to what
"fundamental" means. The "fundamental unfairness" category,
therefore, has the potential for expansion. Second, state evidence rules
generally conform to the Supreme Court's criteria for risk allocation.
They deviate from these criteria only in special cases in which the
216. This discussion is inspired by a real-life example: Blankenship v. General Motors
Corporation, 406 S.E.2d 781 (W. Va. 1991), a case in which the West Virginia Supreme Court
adopted the "crashworthiness" doctrine for product liability actions against car manufacturers.
In formulating the proof requirements, the court ruled that the plaintiffs evidence only needed
to show "a defect that was a factor in causing some aspect of the plaintiffs harm." Id. at 786.
Based on this evidence, a jury now can award the plaintiff full compensation. The court reasoned
that it adopts this rule on the basis of "the same actuarial considerations that have prompted us
finally to adopt the doctrine of crashworthiness-namely, that we [West Virginians] are already
paying for full coverage." Id. The Court supplemented this reasoning by a candid remark that
"[iun any adversarial system where residents are pitted against non-residents, there will
inevitably be a temptation to redistribute wealth in the direction of residents," and that "[by] far
the best tax is one imposed on a stranger who can't vote or otherwise retaliate." Id. at 787 n.ll.
For further discussion of this decision, see infra notes 268-278 and accompanying text.
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local interest for a different allocation of the risk of error is
particularly strong. Most importantly, such deviations have low
visibility. They affect the fate of individual litigants without
attempting to rewrite constitutional law. Third, state evidence rules
tend to align with the Federal Rules of Evidence, promulgated by the
Supreme Court.
This constitutional equilibrium is not accidental. It arises from
implicit understandings between the Supreme Court and state
courts, 217 which are the result of power and culture. These
understandings are produced by three different dynamics, analyzed in
the sections below. I call these dynamics constitutional detente,
constitutional culture, and federal safe harbors. These dynamics
create understandings that produce a de facto constitutional law of
evidence.
These dynamics also highlight the divergence of state and state
judges' interests. Residents' well-being is of paramount interest to the
state and its elected politicians. The state, therefore, has a strong
incentive to formulate a system of factfinding that helps prosecutors to
convict criminal defendants 218 and enhances the residents' protection
against fraud, bad products, and other hazards. This system's
compliance with the Supreme Court's constitutional standards would
depend solely on the Court's ability to enforce its standards against
the state. This ability, as I explain below, is limited. No state,
however, has taken advantage of this limited ability to develop a onesided system of factfinding. While some state rules of evidence do
single-mindedly promote residents' interests, 219 most of those rules are
unbiased and largely align with the Court's criteria for risk allocation.
My explanation of this phenomenon underscores the crucial
involvement of state judges in the formation of the law of evidence.
The meaning, the implications, and the constitutional validity of state
rules of evidence are determined by state judges, whose values and
incentives are different from those of state politicians.
For state judges, residents' well-being is significant, but not allimportant. A judge's decisions determine her professional ethos and
reputation. Making decisions perceived as correct and being reversed
rarely is integral to garnering the respect of the legal community. For
217. These understandings may also involve state legislators. Courts, however, are always
the dominant players because no evidence rule can bypass them. Courts do not merely interpret
and apply evidence rules; they also can void those rules on constitutional grounds.
218. Cf. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(d) (establishing people's "right to truth-in-evidence" by a
constitutional demand that, generally, "relevant evidence shall not be excluded in any criminal
proceeding" except under statute enacted by a super-majority in each house of the Legislature).
219. See infra Section III.A.
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senior judges, judgeship is also an opportunity to participate in
nationwide constitutional governance and dialogue. 220 Apart from
enhancing a judge's reputation, this participation adds to her legacy
as a judge. 22 1 For these reasons, doing the right thing has intrinsic
value for state judges. This constitutional culture explains the
congruence between many state evidence rules and the Supreme
Court's agenda in risk-allocation. The power relationships with which
my exposition begins do not tell the whole story.
A. ConstitutionalDdtente

The Supreme Court's preferences in allocating the risk of error
determine the moral limits that the Court imposes on legislators and
other courts. By imposing its criteria for risk-allocation, the Court
protects those important interests that other political actors, including
lower courts, tend to ignore. 222 This protection reflects the Court's
223
independent vision of the good.
The Supreme Court has the power to impose this vision on
federal actors. The Court's Justices have lifetime tenures, and their
decisions face no judicial review. The prospect of legislative overruling
by Congress may impact the Court's decisions, 224 but in the area of
constitutional decisionmaking, as opposed to statutory interpretation
and common law, this prospect is unlikely. 225 Congress may threaten
the Court with budgetary repercussions. 226 This threat, however, is

220. See, e.g., J. Anthony Mine, Comment, The Politicalizationof Crime, 46 HASTINGS L.J.
1087, 1093 (1995) (a senior California judge describing the "right to truth-in-evidence" provision
of CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(d) as threatening "the quality of American justice").
221. Cf. Mitu Gulati & C.M.A. McCauliff, On Not Making Law, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
157, 165, 204 (1998) (observing that judges generally care about their reputation, esteem, and
legacy).
222. William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV.
780, 781 (2006), describes this account of the Supreme Court's constitutional jurisprudence as a
view according to which "politics is to constitutional law as a disease is to the medicine that
cures it."
223. I focus here on the Supreme Court's revealed preferences as exhibited by its decisions.
224. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation
Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 390-97 (1991) (predicting this impact).
225. See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 442-43 (2000) (declaring
unconstitutional 18 U.S.C. § 3501, an attempt by Congress to repeal the exclusionary rule set
forth in Mirandav. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)).
226. Richard A. Posner, JudicialBehavior and Performance:An Economic Approach, 32 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 1259, 1277 (2005); see also Eugenia Froedge Toma, CongressionalInfluence and
the Supreme Court: The Budget as a Signaling Device, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 131, 134-35 (1991)
(arguing that congressional budgetary generosity toward the Supreme Court correlates with
whether Congress likes the Court's decisions).
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largely theoretical, and it hardly influences the Court's decisions. 227
The President's ability to dilute the Justices' power by appointing new
Justices with rival agendas, 228 while more significant, is often
229
ineffectual because vacancies rarely occur.
State courts, in contrast, can undermine the Supreme Court's
agenda. 230 Their judges have a strong political incentive to promote
local interests, such as crime reduction, because failure to promote
23 1
those interests may put the judge at risk of losing the next election.
Failure to expand residents' rights in product liability actions against
232
out-of-state manufacturers also exposes judges to voter retaliation.
When protecting local interests, state courts can take advantage of the
fact that the Court only reviews a very small number of cases.
Accordingly, they can be massively noncompliant. Unable to review
most non-complying decisions, the Court would then have to relax its
233
constitutional criteria for state laws.

227. The political attitudes towards the Supreme Court are not uniform and change from
Congress to Congress. This factor dilutes the threat of budgetary retaliation. John M. De
Figueiredo & Emerson H. Tiller, Congressional Control of the Courts: A Theoretical and
EmpiricalAnalysis of Expansion of the Federal Judiciary,39 J.L. & ECON. 435, 451 n.40 (1996).
See also Nancy C. Staudt et al., JudicialDecisions as Tax Legislation: Congressional Oversight
of Supreme Court Tax Cases, 1954-2005, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1340, 1352-55 (2007) (carrying out a
comprehensive empirical study establishing that, although Congress occasionally responds in a
negative way to the Court's decisions, the number of positive Congressional responses, including
codification of the Court's jurisprudence, is at least as high). With the federal judiciary as a
whole, things are different. See Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury:
Transforming the Meaning of Article III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924, 1011-12 (2000) (observing that
the federal judiciary is heavily dependent on Congress for resources).
228. Posner, supra note 226.
229. Any new appointment also goes through a partisan confirmation proceeding in the
Senate. See generally Stephen Carter, The Confirmation Mess, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1185 (1988).
The sitting Justices can strengthen the opposition to a rival nominee by issuing decisions that
portray her agenda as a radical departure from the constitutional mainline.
230. Federal judges have no systemic incentives to do so and are also controllable by the
Supreme Court's appellate power.
231. See, e.g., John H. Culver & John T. Wold, Rose Bird and the Politics of Judicial
Accountability in California, 70 JUDICATURE 81, 87-89 (1986) (describing how conservative
opponents waged a multimillion-dollar campaign that unseated three California Supreme Court
Justices for being soft on crime).
232. See ERIC A. HELLAND & ALEXANDER TABARROK, JUDGE AND JURY: AMERICAN TORT LAW

ON TRIAL 67-94 (2006) (demonstrating empirically that partisan-elected judges tend to increase
in-state plaintiffs' awards in tort actions against out-of-state corporate defendants).
233. See McNollgast, Politics and the Courts:A Positive Theory of Judicial Doctrine and the
Rule of Law, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1631, 1649-51 (1995) (analyzing this dynamic). Collective action
does not seem to be a big problem for state courts. See, e.g., Victoria A. Saker, Federalism, The
Great Writ, and Extrajudicial Politics: The Conference of Chief Justices, 1949-1966, in
FEDERALISM AND THE JUDICIAL MIND: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND POLITICS

131, 131 (Harry N. Scheiber ed., 1992) (discussing an organization of state chief judges formed in
1949 to wage "a 15-year crusade to trim the habeasjurisdiction of the federal courts").
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Failure to comply with a Supreme Court precedent can prove
costly, though. The disobedient judge faces the prospect of reversal,
which is detrimental to her career. 234 Systematic deviation from what
is perceived as the "law of the land" would also mark the judge as
radical or idiosyncratic. These are not desirable images for most
judges. 235 These prospects motivate state judges to keep the
noncompliance weapon for unavoidable and politically critical conflicts
with the Court. State judges are well aware that the Court is not
interested in initiating constitutional wars that it is not certain to win.
They also know how far the Court will go to avoid such a war.236 The
Court is willing to allow state judges space to promote local interests
at the expense of its agenda. And this space has a constitutional name:
federalism.237

This space is not unlimited. The Supreme Court must define its
limits in order to protect its agenda and constitutional authority
against open and systematic noncompliance. Such noncompliance not
only could thwart the Court's agenda but also could erode its authority
by motivating further noncompliance. The Court therefore designates
the federalist space for deviations that are silent, occasional, and
relatively invisible. For a number of reasons, the Court cannot
expressly negotiate this space with state courts. First, the Court needs
to appear apolitical. 23 8 Second, it often is not possible to determine the
239
boundaries of the federalist space before a real controversy arises.
Finally, the Court expects state courts to protect its agenda against
divergent initiatives by state legislators. An express commitment to
this effect would make a state court unpopular and politically

234. See POSNER, supra note 107, at 543 (noting that judges are prestige maximizers and are
sensitive to being reversed by a higher court); Posner, supra note 226, at 1271 (mentioning
reversal rate among indicators of judicial promotion, which affects performance); see also Emery
G. Lee III, Horizontal Stare Decisis on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 92 KY. L.J.
767, 771 (2004) ("Lower federal court judges may fear reversal by a higher court and may harbor
ambitions for higher office ... ").
235. See Suzanna Sherry, Judges of Character, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 793, 800 (2003)
("The common law method, which encourages a simultaneously respectful but open-minded
attitude toward precedent, tends to rein in the most radically arrogant.").
236. Cf. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 221 (1960) ("[A] healthy federalism depends
upon the avoidance of needless conflict between state and federal courts.").
237. See generally Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Evolving Understandingsof American Federalism:
Some Shifting Parameters,50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 635 (2006).
238. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Foreword: The Court's Agenda-And the Nation's, 120
HARv. L. REV. 4, 57 (2006) (observing that the Supreme Court fosters appearance of "neutrality
and political disinterest").
239. See Peter H. Schuck, Citizenship in Federal Systems, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 195, 198 (2000)
("All genuine federal systems are highly complex, contingent products of unique historical, social,
and political forces.").
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vulnerable. The Court and state courts thus establish a workable
balance through an implicit communication of mutual threats,
promises, and commitments. 240 This balance and its benefits form a
constitutional d~tente between the Court and state courts.
This detente explains the "fundamental unfairness" doctrine
that otherwise appears underinclusive. By this doctrine, the Supreme
Court signals to state courts that it will invalidate an evidence rule
only when the rule openly defies its risk-allocating agenda. This signal
is transmitted by the doctrine's conventional understanding.
According to this understanding, the doctrine bans only false
testimony that the government suborns or induces 24 1 and evidence
from which factfinders can draw no rational inferences against the
defendant. 242 Such abuses of the process are too fundamental and too
salient to condone. The Court thus signals that it will tolerate only
invisible violations that promote state interests. For transparent
violations, the Court retains the option to retaliate by expanding the
"fundamental unfairness" category. 243 These signals define the
federalist space for state courts. The Court makes those signals
credible by incorporating them in the constitutional doctrine. State
courts seize the federalist space but reciprocate by staying within the
defined boundaries. They deviate from the Court's agenda only in
244
special cases, and they do so invisibly.
240. This account is inspired by Schelling's theory of strategic communications. See THOMAS
C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 119-39 (1960) (identifying equilibrium-attaining

dynamics between adversaries communicating implicitly by threats and commitments).
241. See supra notes 130-139 and accompanying text.
242. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
243. The Court also maintains a threat to lay down "watershed rules" of constitutional
criminal procedure. A single watershed rule can invalidate a large number of criminal
convictions retroactively-a consequence that undermines the power and authority of state
courts. But the Court has held that it will use its power to announce a watershed rule only in
extreme circumstances that "implicate the fundamental fairness of the trial." See Teague v.
Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 312 (1989). Specifically, a watershed rule will apply retroactively on
collateral review of convictions when it "alter[s] our understanding of the bedrock procedural
elements that must be found to vitiate the fairness of a particular conviction" and is necessary to
prevent an "impermissibly large risk" of erroneous conviction. Id. at 311-13 (quoting Mackey v.
United States, 401 U.S. 667, 693-94 (1971), and Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 262
(1969)); see also Whorton v. Bockting, 127 S. Ct. 1173, 1182-84 (2007) (applying Teague's twoprong standard and denying the watershed status to Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36
(2004)); Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 356 (2004) (reaffirming Teague's two-prong
standard for watershed rules). The watershed weapon thus can be perceived as a residual
component of the strategic balance between the Supreme Court and state courts.
244. This understanding of the "fundamental unfairness" doctrine complements the theory of
constitutional interpretation set forth in JED RUBENFELD, REVOLUTION BY JUDICIARY: THE
STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 13-15, 114-24 (2005), and articulated in Jed

Rubenfeld, The Paradigm-Case Method, 115 YALE L.J. 1977 (2006). Rubenfeld's theory
distinguishes between "application understandings" the framers' and the Supreme Court's
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State courts deviate with the help of rules that control
evidential adequacy. These rules allow judges to block evidence on
unreliability grounds. 245 They also authorize judges to admit
questionable evidence 246 and to suppress evidence that is generally
trustworthy. 247 In doing so, the rules allocate informational risks
without explicitly acknowledging this effect. Their application is factintensive: state judges always must consider the specifics of the
evidence that they admit or block. These situation-specific decisions
have low visibility. Adjudicators combine these decisions with orderly
applications of the conventional burdens of proof and rules of
procedure. These applications display constitutionally adequate
allocations of decisional and participatory risks and downplay the
divergent apportionment of informational risks. The hidden
apportionment of informational risks gives state courts a needed
flexibility. State courts are able to promote local interests by skewing
the risk of error in any chosen direction within understood limits.
Their allocations of risk stay out of sight and thereby may deviate
248
quietly from the Supreme Court's agenda.

commitments to particular meanings of what constitutional rights prohibit-and "no-application
understandings" that are merely intentions not to expand the scope of existing constitutional
rights. Because intentions, unlike commitments, are not binding, the Supreme Court is free to
reexamine the no-application understandings and develop new rights and new meanings of
unconstitutionality. The Court, however, is not free to deviate from the application
understandings by making constitutional what, in fact, is not. The "fundamental unfairness"
doctrine and its floating constitutional threat fall into a separate in-between category of
"strategic understandings" that features no commitments or intentions in either direction.
245. A good example of such a rule is the Frye doctrine, which conditions the admissibility of
expert evidence on the "standing and scientific recognition" of its methodology. Frye v. United
States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923); see also David E. Bernstein & Jeffrey D. Jackson, The
Daubert Trilogy in the States, 44 JURIMETRICS J. 351, 355 n.25 (2004) (reporting that a
substantial number of states still follow Frye in one form or another). Another example is a
Virginia statute prescribing that an interested party's testimony against a person incapable of
testifying requires corroboration. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-397 (2006), construed in Williams v.
Condit, 574 S.E.2d 241, 244 (Va. 2003).
246. See infra text accompanying notes 259-276.
247. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26.115(b) (2000) (providing that, subject to a necessitybased exception, only Tennessee physicians or those from a "contiguous bordering state" can
testify as experts in medical malpractice actions before Tennessee courts); see also Legg v.
Chopra, 286 F.3d 286, 291 (6th Cir. 2002) (categorizing Tennessee's restriction for medical
experts' testimony as a "substantive" rule applicable in diversity cases); Hartsell ex rel. Upton v.
Fort Sanders Reg'l Med. Ctr., 905 S.W.2d 944, 950 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995) (upholding exclusion of
the American Medical Association rules pertaining to disputed treatment because under
Tennessee law, doctors' standard of care must be proven by local experts). This rule protects
Tennessee doctors against malpractice lawsuits and possibly reduces the cost of medical care for
the people of Tennessee.
248. State courts cannot deviate from this agenda invisibly by redesigning their procedures.
Any such change in the law would be general and, consequently, conspicuous. Modification of the
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This equilibrium can be exemplified by both criminal and civil
evidence doctrines. I begin with a criminal evidence example. The
Supreme Court disfavors the idea of using a defendant's propensity to
commit crimes as evidence of her guilt. The Court expressly
committed itself to the principle, "Judge the act, not the actor," by
holding that propensity evidence is excessively prejudicial to the
defendant. 249 Admission of such evidence increases the defendant's
informational risk, thus exposing her to the risk of erroneous
conviction. 250 This exposure to the risk of error does not align with the
"equal best" standard. 25 1
But Congress differed from the Supreme Court in enacting
Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 414. These rules allow the
prosecution to adduce evidence of prior sexual misconduct against a
252
defendant charged with rape, sexual assault, or child molestation.
The defendant's past as a sexual predator can evidence his
commission of the act on trial and his guilty mind. Past misconduct
253
only needs to be sufficiently similar to the present accusation.
Unlike most federal rules of evidence, Rules 413 and 414 were enacted
by Congress. Their enactment bypassed the regular Rules Enabling
Act procedure. 254 The Court did not promulgate these rules and likely
was against them. 255 The Court, however, is unlikely to pronounce

proof burdens would be conspicuous, as well, because these rules expressly identify the bearers of
the risk of error. See 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 16, §§ 336-37 (explaining burdens of proof).
249. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948).
250. See STEIN, supra note 8, at 183-85 (explaining that propensity evidence cannot integrate
with case-specific information and thus only can increase the statistical chances of guilt); see also
John Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Factfinding Process, 20 STAN. L. REV. 1065, 1073-77
(1968) (observing that evidence of a defendant's bad character dilutes the regret associated with
the jurors' prospect of convicting him erroneously and motivates jurors to be lax in applying the
"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard).
251. STEIN, supra note 8, at 183-85.
252. The trial judge may still exclude this evidence as unduly prejudicial to the defendant,
using her general discretion under FED. R. EVID. 403. But see Orenstein, supra note 142, at 151840 (expressing well-founded skepticism about the performance of this gatekeeping role by trial
judges in rape and child molestation cases).
253. The similarity condition is implied in the "relevancy" requirement expressly imposed by
Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 414. See Orenstein, supra note 142, at 1527-30 (discussing the
effect that similarity has on admissibility and probative value of sexual misconduct evidence).
254. Congress enacted those rules as part of the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 320935(a), 108 Stat. 1796, 2135-37. 23 CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5411, at 36061 (Supp. 2007).
255. The Judicial Conference of the United States urged Congress not to adopt these rules.
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ON

ADMISSION OF CHARACTER EVIDENCE IN CERTAIN SEXUAL MISCONDUCT CASES (1995), reprinted
in 56 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 2139, 2140 (Feb. 15, 1995); see also Eileen A. Scallen, Analyzing "The
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them unconstitutional because they have a very limited scope of
application. 56 At federal trials, the Court also can use its supervisory
power 257 to diminish the rules' applicability. 258 These impact-limiting
factors make it politically imprudent for the Court to clash with
Congress over the rules' constitutionality.
As far as state trials are concerned, propensity rules fall into
the federalist space within which courts are permitted to promote local
interests. Admission of propensity evidence by state courts runs
against the Supreme Court's agenda for risk-allocation, but not openly
so. State judges always do more than just allow the jury to count
propensity evidence as increasing the probability of the defendant's
guilt. They apply the Court's procedural safeguards against erroneous
conviction and instruct the jury to acquit the defendant if the
accusations are not proven beyond all reasonable doubt. Their
deviations from the Court's agenda consequently have low visibility.
The most striking example of this dynamic is the "lustful
disposition" rule that numerous states have adopted. 259 This rule
allows the prosecution to prove sexual offense accusations by evidence
that points to the defendant's lustful disposition. Georgia courts have
developed the broadest admissibility rules for lustful dispositions.
They let in evidence of past sexual misconduct irrespective of the
period separating the misconduct from the act on trial. 260 They also
impose no similarity requirements for misconduct; a defendant's past
sexual misconduct need not be similar to the act on trial in order to
evidence it.261 This broad admissibility rule extends to all sexual
Politics of [Evidence] Rulemaking," 53 HASTINGS L.J. 843, 856 (2002) (recounting the opposition
of the Judicial Conference to FED. R. EVID. 413-415).
256. Because rape and other sexual offenses are predominantly state crimes, Rules 413-414
apply almost exclusively in military federal cases and in Indian Country. Orenstein, supra note
142, at 1490.
257. See infra note 301 and accompanying text.
258. The Court can do so by imposing strict interpretation on the admissibility conditions set
by those rules, as well as by encouraging federal courts to exclude prior misconduct evidence
under FED. R. EVID. 403.

259. See Thomas J. Reed, Reading Gaol Revisited: Admission of Uncharged Misconduct
Evidence in Sex Offender Cases, 21 AM. J. CRIM. L. 127, 188 (1993) (attesting that many states
admit "lustful disposition" evidence).
260. See, e.g., Mikell v. State, 637 S.E.2d 142, 146-47 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) (affirming
admission of evidence of defendant's uncharged sexual activities with a minor during 1994-97 to
prove child molestation in 2003).
261. See, e.g., Cook v. State, 625 S.E.2d 83, 89 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005) (affirming admission of
evidence of defendant's unwelcome fondling of a sixteen-year old girl to prove molestation of a
six-year-old girl); Brown v. State, 620 S.E.2d 394, 398 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005) (affirming admission of
evidence of defendant's uninvited homosexual fondling of a twenty-nine-year-old man to prove
his lustful disposition towards young boys); Beck v. State, 587 S.E.2d 316, 319-20 (Ga. Ct. App.
2003) (affirming admission of evidence of defendant's "deviant" sexual act with his wife to prove
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activities apart from possession of sexual paraphernalia. 262 As such, it
helps the prosecution to convict dangerous sex offenders. But the rule
also exposes defendants accused of sexual crimes to a serious
informational risk. From time to time, this risk may result in a
wrongful conviction.
Despite this prospect, the risk is not unconstitutional. For that
reason, its numerous impositions on defendants never have been
challenged before the Supreme Court. 263 A defendant's lustful
disposition always can be remotely probative of the accusations. For
example, it can prove that the defendant had a guilty mind. Admission
of such evidence therefore would not qualify as fundamentally unfair.
The availability of a rational inference makes the unfairness to the
defendant not fundamental enough to warrant an incursion into state
law. 264 This factor also makes the unfairness invisible: one virtually
never can find indications that factfinders put the evidence to an
improper use. Most importantly, Georgia courts execute this "tough on
sex crimes" policy in combination with their faithful observance of the
constitutional rules that allocate decisional and participatory risks.
The Supreme Court of Georgia committed itself to the application of
the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard. 265 Based on the
Confrontation Clause, it voided Georgia's necessity exception to the
hearsay rule as applying to testimonial evidence. 266 This decision
impedes the prosecution of sex and domestic violence offenses. 267 The
resulting allocation of informational, decisional, and participatory
risks protects Georgia's local interests, and it does so without defying
the Court's agenda.
In the civil domain, I take my example from products liability
law. State courts have an incentive to favor in-state plaintiffs by
his lustful disposition towards performance of similar acts with his young stepdaughters); Hall v.
State, 419 S.E.2d 503, 504-05 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (affirming admission of evidence of defendant's
intercourse with his younger sister to prove his lustful disposition towards sexually fondling and
rubbing his daughter fifteen years later).
262. See Simpson v. State, 523 S.E.2d 320, 321-22 (Ga. 1999) (holding that sexual
paraphernalia are admissible to establish "lustful disposition" only in exceptional cases).
263. For an unsuccessful attempt by a Missouri defendant, see State v. Lachterman, 812
S.W.2d 759, 768-69 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 983 (1992), in which the court
upheld the admission of prior sodomies with young boys and possession of child pornography as
evidencing defendant's "depraved sexual instinct" in a new sodomy trial.
264. See Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 920 (9th Cir. 1991).
265. See Garland v. State, 325 S.E.2d 131, 133 (Ga. 1985) (reaffirming the requirement that
guilt be established beyond a reasonable doubt).
266. Richard v. State, 637 S.E.2d 406, 409 (Ga. 2006).
267. See Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford, 91 VA. L. REV. 747, 771-73
(2005) (demonstrating that expansion of the confrontation right makes prosecutors more likely to
drop charges when a vulnerable victim of the crime recants or refuses to cooperate).

20081

CONSTITUTIONAL EVIDENCE LAW

forcing out-of-state manufacturers to pay those plaintiffs excessive
compensation. 268 To achieve this result, state courts may impose
punitive damages on out-of-state manufacturers. 269 This incentive is
particularly strong in jurisdictions with split-recovery statutes that
direct a fixed percentage of punitive damage awards to stateadministered funds.27 0 For these reasons, the Due Process Clause-as
interpreted by the Supreme Court-restricts courts' ability to impose
punitive damages. 271 This interpretation of due process protects
defendants against impositions of decisional and participatory risks. If
the courts' assessment of punitive damages were to remain
indeterminate, defendants would be exposed to a serious decisional
risk. The absence of criteria for imposing such damages also would
curtail the defendants' ability to defend against their imposition. This
curtailment would expose the defendants to a serious participatory
risk. The Court's guideposts for assessing punitive damages reduce
those risks. 272 These guideposts condition the availability of a punitive
damage award on the reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct and
on whether criminal and administrative sanctions sufficiently deter
it.273 The guideposts also require that the award be proportionate to
274
the actual damage suffered by the plaintiff.
But what about informational risks? Can a state court devise
an evidence rule that would make it easier for an in-state plaintiff to
prove a case against the manufacturer? The West Virginia Supreme
Court has devised such a rule. 275 Under this rule, a plaintiff in a
crashworthiness case can establish that her entire injury was caused
by the car defect merely by showing that the defect was "a factor in
causing some aspect of the plaintiffs harm."276 Based on this partial

268. See, e.g., Blankenship v. Gen. Motors Corp., 406 S.E.2d 781, 787 n.11 (W. Va. 1991)
(acknowledging the presence of this incentive).
269. See, e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 563-65 (1996) (documenting an
Alabama court's award of punitive damages in the amount of $4,000,000 to a doctor from
Birmingham who purchased a new BMW sports sedan without being told that it was repainted
following acid rain).
270. For analysis of these statutes and their implications, see Catherine M. Sharkey,
Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347, 375-80, 414-22 (2003).
271. See Gore, 517 U.S. at 574-86 (voiding a punitive damage award for being excessive and
determining guideposts for assessing punitive damages under the Due Process Clause).
272. See id.; see also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416-18
(2003).
273. Gore, 517 U.S. at 575-86.
274. Id. at 581 (holding that few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and
compensatory damages satisfy due process).
275. Blankenship v. Gen. Motors Corp., 406 S.E.2d 781, 786-87 (W. Va. 1991).
276. Id. at 786.
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causation evidence, the jury has discretion to award the plaintiff the
full amount of compensation.
This rule forces defendants to compensate plaintiffs for
unproven damages. Nonetheless, it passes constitutional muster for
three doctrinal reasons. First, the "fundamental unfairness" rule has
yet to be extended to civil trials. 277 Second, the factfinder still may
decide the case either way under the preponderance standard. Finally,
relying on injury-enhancement evidence as a proof of full causation is
279
not altogether irrational. 278 The "one rational inference" criterion
shields the rule from the Supreme Court's constitutional intervention.
The prime reason for upholding the rule's constitutionality is not
doctrinal, though. The rule's applications do not align with the Court's
risk-allocating preferences. These applications, however, are situation
specific and therefore largely invisible. Their low visibility separates
them from court decisions that impose punitive damages or reverse
the proof burden for no good reason. This factor keeps the West
2
Virginia rule within the federalist space. 80
B. ConstitutionalCulture
The informal constitutional law of evidence is not only about
power. It is also about the culture of doing the right thing.28 1 Within
this framework, the Supreme Court and state courts do not simply
divide rule-making power. Rather, they share constitutional
governance through coordination and dialogue in the atmosphere of
mutual respect. 28 2 The Court does not demarcate a free-hand territory
within which state judges can protect their voters from crime by
exposing defendants to an increased risk of erroneous conviction.
Rather, it trusts those judges' institutional commitment to justice and
277. Presently, this rule only applies in criminal cases. See supra notes 121-142 and
accompanying text.
278. See ARIEL PORAT & ALEX STEIN, TORT LIABILITY UNDER UNCERTAINTY 81-83 (2001)

(observing that such inferences may be justified, but preferring the partial-compensation
approach).
279. See Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 920 (9th Cir. 1991).
280. The West Virginia Supreme Court signaled that it would make a different rule if
"responsible leadership in a federal structure" could secure an "explicit and binding coordination"
between states. Blankenship, 406 S.E.2d at 786 n.10. This signaling is far from accidental.
281. I thank Bruce Ackerman for drawing my attention to this phenomenon.
282. See Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1805 (2007)
(rationalizing courts' applications of constitutional principles as organizing a dialogue between
generations and setting a system of sustained deliberation that protects society's achievements
from transient desires for change and populist temptations); see also Barry Friedman, Dialogue
and JudicialReview, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577, 653-58 (1993) (developing a constitutional dialogue
model for multiple political actors).
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does not interfere. The Court also realizes that its risk-allocating
agenda is not uniquely correct and that it need not apply universally.
Allocation of participatory and decisional risks by the rules of
procedure and burdens of proof is general by definition. As such, it
warrants an imposition of uniform constitutional standards. But from
the state courts' perspective, these standards may require fine-tuning.
Skewing the informational risk in a chosen direction is the best way to
make local adjustments. Because informational risks are situation
specific, their allocation does not alter the general constitutional
standards. State courts consequently introduce the required
adjustments by formulating their own rules of evidence. 28 3 These rules
do not necessarily align with the Supreme Court's view, nor do they
uniformly promote local interests. Instead, they often advance the
state court's broader conception of justice.
The constitutional d6tente theory therefore does not fully
explain state courts' evidential practices. Contrary to populist
expectations, these courts are not uniformly tough on crime. They
may, in fact, increase the rate of wrongful acquittals in order to
heighten the defendant's protection against the risk of erroneous
conviction beyond the Supreme Court's constitutional minimum. If, by
doing so, state courts sacrifice local interest, it is to promote higher
justice and to participate meaningfully in the constitutional
governance and dialogue. What follows are three salient examples of
this important phenomenon.
The first example is DNA evidence. This evidence does not fall
into any constitutionally suspect category; a jury's finding that DNA
identifies the defendant as a perpetrator of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt is constitutionally sufficient. But a number of state
courts rule out the possibility of convicting a defendant upon DNA
evidence alone 28 4 because DNA only identifies the frequency of a
random match between people's genetic patterns. Hence, even when
the match is extremely rare, it can only identify the defendant as
belonging to a small group of people sharing the pattern. 28 5 The
prosecution's case remains deficient because of the absence of case283. Such rules also may be enacted, but courts ultimately would interpret them and
determine their constitutionality.
284. See, e.g., State v. Skipper, 637 A.2d 1101, 1108 (Conn. 1994) (holding that an
inculpating genetic pattern that only one out of 3,497 people could have cannot establish alone
the defendant's guilt beyond all reasonable doubt); Commonwealth v. Rocha, 784 N.E.2d 651, 658
n.13 (Mass. Ct. App. 2003) (holding DNA evidence sufficient for defendant's conviction because
case-specific evidence unequivocally identified him as one of two possible perpetrators of the
crime); Griffith v. State, 976 S.W.2d 241, 249 (Tex. App. 1998) (holding DNA evidence sufficient
for defendant's conviction because case-specific evidence singled him out as a prime suspect).
285. See, e.g., Skipper, 637 A.2d at 1103-04 & n.9.
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specific evidence singling out the defendant as a likely perpetrator.
These holdings align with the "equal best" standard, 2 6 but not with
the citizens' interest in convicting as many criminals as possible.
The second example involves the corroboration requirement for
confessions. 2 7 The Supreme Court of New Jersey ruled that a jury
cannot determine the defendant's eligibility for capital punishment on
the basis of her uncorroborated confession. 28 8 This ruling requires the
judge in a trial for aggravated murder to determine whether there is
independent evidence corroborating the defendant's voluntary
confession. Absence of corroborative evidence makes the defendant
ineligible for capital punishment. 2 9 The court justified this ruling on
constitutional grounds, 290 stating that "[o]ur State policy seems always
to have favored that something more than his or her words would send
a defendant to death. 29 1
Other state courts have developed similar requirements. 292 The
Supreme Court of Tennessee, for example, has imposed the
corroboration requirement for all confessions as a constitutional
standard. 293 Such decisions go beyond the constitutional due process
minimum. Federal law that evolves from the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence
also
requires
corroboration
for
defendants'

286. See STEIN, supra note 8, at 86-88, 204 (arguing that statistical evidence alone is
insufficient to convict a defendant, no matter how statistically probable the accusations may be).
A DNA match becomes case specific only when it practically eliminates all suspects other than
the defendant. See David H. Kaye & Michael E. Smith, DNA Identification Databases:Legality,
Legitimacy, and the Case for Population-WideCoverage, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 413, 438 (calling for a
population-wide amassment of DNA samples as a means for easy apprehension of repeat
offenders and minimization of the risk of erroneous conviction).
287. Cf. Boaz Sangero, Miranda is Not Enough: A New Justificationfor Demanding "Strong
Corroboration"to a Confession, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2791 (2007) (advocating heightening of
corroboration requirements for confessions).
288. State v. Di Frisco, 571 A.2d 914, 928 (N.J. 1990). For a recent application of this
requirement, see State v. Reddish, 859 A.2d 1173, 1211-15 (N.J. 2004).
289. Di Frisco, 571 A.2d at 924.
290. Id. at 926-27 (invoking the principles of due process); see also id. at 936 (Handler, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that finding a defendant eligible for capital
punishment on his uncorroborated confession "insults the values inherent in fundamental
fairness and the constitutional protections that assure due process").
291. Id. at 928 (majority opinion).
292. See, e.g., Littlejohn v. State, 989 P.2d 901, 911 (Okla. Crim. App. 1998) (holding in a
murder case that a defendant's confession had no corroboration and that its admission therefore
violated due process).
293. See State v. Housler, 193 S.W.3d 476, 490 (Tenn. 2006) ("Due Process is violated when
the jury convicts on the basis of the defendant's confession absent corroborating evidence of the
corpus delicti." (citing State v. Smith, 24 S.W.3d 274, 281 (Tenn. 2000))).
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confessions. 294 However, this requirement has yet to acquire
295
constitutional status.
The third example is the corroboration requirement for
accomplice testimony, adopted by numerous states. 296 As explained by
the California Supreme Court, this requirement is court created,
rather than constitutionally based. 297 Federal law does not require
corroboration as a condition for basing a defendant's conviction on the
testimony of her accomplice, 298 nor does the Supreme Court's due
process jurisprudence. 299 State courts again go beyond the
constitutional minimum to protect defendants from the risk of
300
erroneous conviction.
C. FederalSafe Harbors
In 1943, the Supreme Court announced its authority under
Article III of the Constitution to devise rules of evidence for federal
courts. 30 1 Previously, the Rules Enabling Act of 1934302 gave the Court
"the power to prescribe general rules of ... evidence for cases in the

294. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488-90 (1963); Smith v. United States, 348
U.S. 147, 152-53 (1954); Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 89-90 (1954); United States v.
Deville, 278 F.3d 500, 506-07 (5th Cir. 2002).
295. See United States v. Bukowski, 435 F.2d 1094, 1106 n.7 (7th Cir. 1970) ("[Ilt is not clear
whether [the corroboration requirement for confessions] need be treated as a feature of 'Due
Process.' ").

296. See TORCIA, supranote 144.
297. In re Mitchell P., 587 P.2d 1144, 1146 (Cal. 1978); see also People v. Felton, 18 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 626, 637 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) ("[Tihe corroboration requirement [for accomplice
testimony] is a matter of state law, not due process.").
298. See Watson v. Howard, 123 F. App'x 910, 917 (10th Cir. 2005) ("Federal law does not
require independent corroboration of accomplice testimony .... "); DuBois v. Lockhart, 859 F.2d
1314, 1317 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding that a rational factfinder can find a defendant guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt without additional evidence to corroborate an accomplice's testimony).
299. See United States v. Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348, 352 (1969) (holding that corroboration
requirements for accomplice testimony "do not customarily involve constitutional questions").
300. E.g., State v. Pecor, 972 P.2d 737, 745 (Idaho Ct. App. 1998).
301. See McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340-47 (1943) (holding that a prolonged
detention constitutes pressure rendering the defendant's confession involuntary and,
consequently, inadmissible, and asserting that the Supreme Court's supervisory power under
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 makes it mandatory for federal courts to follow this holding); Johnson v.
United States, 318 U.S. 189, 198-99 (1943) (holding that, independent of the Fifth Amendment, a
prosecutor cannot comment on the defendant's failure to testify, and asserting that the Supreme
Court's supervisory power under U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 makes it mandatory for federal courts
to follow this holding). But see Amy Coney Barrett, The Supervisory Power of the Supreme Court,
106 COLUM. L. REV. 324 (2006) (carrying out a comprehensive study of the constitutional history
of U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, demonstrating that the Supreme Court over-interpreted its
"supremacy" functions).
302. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-77 (2000).
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United States district courts ...and courts of appeals." 30 3 The Court
acted under the latter authority in 1972 by promulgating the Federal
Rules of Evidence. 30 4 After exercising its power to amend those
rules, 30 5 Congress enacted them into law that became effective in
1975,306 and it made a few amendments thereafter. 30 7 This obviated
the Court's need to install constitutional control over federal evidence
rules. Federal trials, both civil and criminal, are conducted primarily
under the Court's rules that implement its vision of how to allocate
the risk of error.
Federal rules of evidence also serve as a model for state courts
and legislators-an important constitutional role outside federal law.
Alignment with a federal rule that the Supreme Court promulgated
and approved in advance practically guarantees that a state rule will
withstand constitutional scrutiny. Federal rules of evidence thus set a
safe-harbor incentive for state rules, on which state courts and
legislators generally act.
In a recent case, Clark v. Arizona, the Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of Arizona's "Mott Rule." 308 The Mott Rule holds
inadmissible testimony of a psychological or psychiatric expert as to
whether the defendant had the requisite mens rea for the crime on
trial.3 0 9 Under this rule, such an expert can only testify on the issue of
insanity, identify the defendant's mental disease, or give observational
testimony about the defendant's behavioral traits. 310 For reasons
stated by the dissenting Justices, this limitation clashes with due
process. 31 1 A mental health expert often is able to provide useful
information about the defendant's capacity to form the mens rea for
the crime. 31 2 Although far from indisputably accurate, this
information can help the defendant raise a reasonable doubt as to
303. Id. § 2072(a).
304. See Edward W. Cleary, PreliminaryNotes on Reading the Rules of Evidence, 57 NEB. L.
REV. 908, 913 (1978) (outlining the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Evidence by the
Supreme Court as delegate of the congressional rulemaking authority). Professor Cleary served
as Reporter to the Advisory Committee for the Federal Rules of Evidence.
305. 28 U.S.C. § 2074. Before the enactment of the Judicial Improvements and Access to
Justice Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642, Congress's power to modify federal rules
of evidence existed in a different format in 28 U.S.C. § 2072.
306. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926.
307. The most significant of those amendments is the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 320935(a), 108 Stat. 1796, 2135-37, that enacted
FED. R. EVID. 413-15.

308.
309.
310.
311.
312.

126 S.Ct. 2709, 2729-37 (2006).
State v. Mott, 931 P.2d 1046, 1051, 1054 (Ariz. 1997) (en banc).
Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2724-26.
Id. at 2743-49 (Kennedy J., dissenting)
Id. at 2746.
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whether he had a guilty mind. The Mott Rule therefore exposes
criminal defendants to a serious informational risk. The
countervailing factors favored by the Court may attract some
utilitarians, but they hardly can legitimize the imposition of the risk
313
of erroneous conviction on individual defendants.
To understand Clark fully, however, one needs to consider
Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b), which the Supreme Court cites in a
footnote. 314 This rule holds:
No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition of a defendant
in a criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to whether the defendant did or
did not have the mental state or condition constituting an element of the crime charged
315
or a defense thereto. Such ultimate issues are matters for the trier of fact alone.

Rule 704(b) and Arizona's Mott Rule are essentially the same, which is
why the Mott Rule was held constitutional. While this rule exposes
defendants to the risk of erroneous conviction, it does so in a way that
the Supreme Court approves in advance.
Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b) is an informal safe harbor for
state rules, as is any other federal rule of evidence. The Federal Rules
of Evidence thus do not function only as a model that advises state
courts and legislators; 3 16 they are also a constitutional guarantor. The
Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules works to
317
secure the constitutionality of the rules and their state equivalents.
This Committee removes constitutional "traps for the unwary," 318 as
courts and legislators opting for the adoption of a federal rule of
evidence should be able to rely on its constitutionality. This creation of
federal safe harbors allows the Supreme Court to control state rules of
evidence.
Indeed, state courts resort to federal rules as safe harbors in
order to shield their decisions from possible invalidation on
constitutional grounds. I illustrate this resort by two decisions of
California and New York courts. These decisions are particularly

313. See STEIN, supra note 8, at 197 (arguing on moral grounds in favor of broad
admissibility of defense expert evidence).
314. Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2725 n.30.
315. FED. R. EVID. 704(b).

316. Federal Rules of Evidence have had a tremendous success in that role. They have been
adopted by all states except California, Georgia, Illinois, Massachusetts, Missouri, New York,
Kansas, and Virginia. In addition to the District of Columbia, forty-two jurisdictions follow these
rules. See 21 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 254, § 5009.
317. See Daniel J. Capra, Amending the Hearsay Exception for Declarations Against Penal
Interest in the Wake of Crawford, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2409, 2431-34 (2005) (attestation by the
Committee's Reporter).
318. Id. at 2433.
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illustrative because neither California nor New York has adopted the
Federal Rules of Evidence.
In a landmark decision, People v. Falsetta,the Supreme Court
of California held that California's statutory removal of the bar
against propensity evidence from sex crime prosecutions3 1 9 does not
violate due process. 320 The court's reasons for this decision included
the similarity between the California statute and Federal Rules of
Evidence 413 and 414, along with the fact that federal courts have
321
upheld the constitutionality of those rules.
The Falsetta decision suppressed the differences between the
California statute and the federal rules. Federal Rules of Evidence 413
and 414 require type similarity between the defendant's past sexual
misconduct and the crime on trial. A sexual assault of an adult victim,
for example, is not admissible as evidence in a federal trial for child
molestation. 322 There is no such requirement in the California statute.
Under the federal rules, the defendant's past sexual misconduct also
must be relevant to an issue on trial. 32 3 The California statute, as
relevancy 324-a
this
Falsetta, presupposes
in
interpreted
presupposition that hinders the defendant's objection to the evidence.
The Falsetta court chose to ignore these differences in order to
accentuate the sameness of the California statute and the federal
rules. This reasoning strategy could serve only one purpose:
establishment of a safe harbor.
People v. Brandon, a recent New York case, presented a
puzzling evidentiary issue. Shortly after his conviction by a jury, the
defendant moved for an order setting aside the verdict. 325 His affidavit
revealed that he had a conversation in the courthouse's hallway with
one of the jurors after the verdict was announced. According to the
affidavit, the juror-whose eyes were glassy and whose breath smelled
of alcohol-had expressed concern for the defendant and regret about
the verdict. The defendant also proffered this juror's testimony as
319. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1108(a) (West 2003) (providing that, subject to a court's general
discretion to exclude preponderantly prejudicial evidence, "in a criminal action in which the
defendant is accused of a sexual offense, evidence of the defendant's commission of another
sexual offense or offenses is not made inadmissible" by the general rule against propensity
evidence).
320. 986 P.2d 182, 187-93 (Cal. 1999).
321. Id.
322. See FED. R. EVID. 414(a) (requiring similarity between categories of victims).
323. FED. R. EVID. 413(a) and 414(a) allow past sexual misconduct to be "considered for its
bearing on any matter to which it is relevant."
324. The court reasoned that past sexual misconduct is "at least circumstantially relevant"
in every trial involving a sex crime. Falsetta,986 P.2d at 188-89.
325. See People v. Brandon, 785 N.Y.S.2d 286, 287-88 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2004).
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independent evidence and called four additional jurors to testify about
the jury's deliberation. The judge ruled the jurors' testimony
inadmissible. 326 Ultimately, she decided that the defendant failed to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the juror's misconduct
327
had affected the verdict.
The judge based her exclusion of the jurors' testimony on the
common law of New York. 328 This decision was constitutionally
problematic, as the defendant's testimony was admitted and merited
proper evaluation. Finding that testimony unpersuasive while
preventing witnesses from corroborating it hardly aligns with due
process. Presumably for that reason, the judge also cited Federal Rule
of Evidence 606(b), which imposes a complete bar on a juror's postverdict testimony concerning "any matter or statement occurring
during the course of the jury's deliberations." Under this rule, a juror
only can testify about an "outside influence" on the jury or its exposure
to "extraneous prejudicial information."3 29 The judge also cited the
Supreme Court's decision in Tanner v. United States.330 Tanner
approved a trial court's suppression of a juror's testimony about his
331
fellow jurors' alcohol and drug consumption.
These citations do not align with New York's "improper
influence" standard for vacating jury verdicts in criminal trials. Under
this standard, any improper influence on the jury capable of working
out an injustice is sufficient cause to vacate the verdict. 332 The
influence need not come from an outside source.33 3 By deciding the
case as it did, the court exposed its decision to a due process challenge.
And to shield itself from that challenge, the court underscored the
alignment between its decision and a federal rule-not applicable in
New York-and quoted the Supreme Court's rationalization of that
rule.

334

326. Id. at 289.
327. Id. at 291.
328. Id. at 288-89.
329. FED. R. EVID. 606(b).
330. Brandon, 785 N.Y.S.2d at 288.
331. Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 125 (1987).
332. See People v. Brown, 399 N.E.2d 51, 53 (N.Y. 1979) (reaffirming a broad "improper
influence" standard for vacating the jury verdict in a criminal case).
333. See id. at 52-54 (holding that a juror's contrived experimentation in front of other jurors
in a robbery trial to affirm that a police witness could see the face of the driver of the getaway
car qualified as "improper influence").
334. See Tanner, 483 U.S. at 117-26 (affirming the fairness and practicality of the rule that
recognizes only an external, as opposed to an internal, influence on the jury as a reason for
vacating verdicts); see also id. at 127 (justifying this differentiation by "long-recognized and very
substantial concerns" that "support the protection of jury deliberations from intrusive inquiry").
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CONCLUSION

This Article began by asking how constitutional law impacts
evidence, yet it ended by asking the reverse: What is the impact of
evidence rules on constitutional law? Asking this question is necessary
because evidence rules are constitutionally unique. The Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Due Process Clause broadly exempts
them from constitutional scrutiny. This exemption separates
evidential adequacy rules from burdens of proof and court procedures,
such as the cross-examination of witnesses, which must satisfy the
Court's demanding constitutional requirements. Burdens of proof and
court procedures allocate the risk of error among the prosecution,
plaintiffs, and defendants. Allocation of this risk is of constitutional
concern because adjudicative errors produce wrongful denials of a
person's liberty or property. Rules that determine what evidence is
admissible and what evidence requires corroboration allocate the
same risk. Constitutional law, nonetheless, does not address this area.
This constitutional asymmetry calls for an explanation. The
most compelling explanation takes into account the broad sweep of the
constitutional standards regulating the burdens of proof and court
procedures. State courts must have the ability to modify this
regulation locally without undermining the Supreme Court's
constitutional authority. Evidence rules are ideally suited for that
purpose because their applications by state courts have low visibility.
These applications are also situation specific. As such, they can
deviate from the Court's vision as to how to allocate risk of error
without engendering
conceptual
clashes with the general
constitutional standards. The Court must accept these quiet
deviations to respect state courts' independent vision of justice and
secure their cooperation in its broad constitutional scheme. The Court
therefore avoids telling state courts and legislators how to design and
apply their evidence rules. Yet for extreme deviations from its vision
of due process, the Court retains a residual power to interfere. The
Court also induces states to align their evidence rules with the
Federal Rules of Evidence, which it promulgates and interprets: this
alignment virtually guarantees the state rule's constitutionality. The
relationship between constitutional law and evidence rules is bidirectional, rather than hierarchical.
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In recent years, there have been lively popular and academic
debates in the United States and elsewhere about whether to redress
injustices committed decades and sometime centuries ago. This
Article examines whether there is a moral justification for repairing
historical injustices. My theme is the difficulty of devising a
compelling moral argument for redressing such injustices,
notwithstanding the moral arguments often invoked by the
proponents of redress. I begin by briefly introducing the claims that
have been advanced in the United States for redressing historical
injustices. In particular,I analyze the characteristicsof the wrongs
for which redress has been claimed, the ways that claims have been
advanced, and the remedies requested. Then I specify three moral
arguments often made in support of redressing historical injustices
and underscore the difficulties of making a case for redress using
these arguments. To emphasize the moral complexity of claims for
redress, I also offer an original case study of a recent claim: the
claim against the Swiss banks for profiting from the Holocaust that
resulted in a $1.25 billion settlement in 1998. This case study
underscores the difficulty of justifying redress for historical
injustices by examining whether the program being implemented to
address the banks' wrongs is morally justifiable. I conclude by
suggesting that the difficulty of justifying claims for redressing
historical injustices counsels in favor of focusing more on recent, as
opposed to historical,injustices.

